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I. INTRODUCTION
Product safety is the province of both the regulatory and the tort
systems. Each system has come under attack in recent years on both
the federal and state levels. Through its regulatory policies, appoint-
ments, and budget cuts, the Reagan Administration has weakened the
federal regulatory system.' At the same time, the Administration has
severely criticized the tort system.2 State legislatures have enacted a
myriad of statutes that weaken the tort system by cutting back on the
common-law rights of victims,3 and additional measures are pending in
Congress4 and in state legislatures across the country.'
1. See, e.g., S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA; THE RUSH TO DEREGULATE
(1983); COSTLE, Environmental Regulation and Regulatory Reform, 57 WASH. L. REv. 409 (1982);
McGARrrY, Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era, 45 MD. L. REv. 253 (1986).
2. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE
CAUSES, ExTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILIrY ANn
AFFORDABILITY (1986) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT] (interagency study, sharply criti-
cal of the tort system and its effect on skyrocketing insurance rates, conducted under the auspices
of the Attorney General of the United States).
3. From 1986 to 1988, legislatures in 38 states passed measures aimed at limiting liability by
narrowing the scope of liability, eliminating joint and several liability, capping damages, and limit-
ing punitive awards. 16 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 108 (1988).
4. See, e.g., H.R. 1115, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); see also Federal Product Liability Bill
Closer to Reality, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 14, 1988, at 5, col. 1. Federal products liability reform has been
before the Congress since 1979. For a history of federal legislative activity in this area, see Twerski,
A Moderate and Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill: Targeting the Crisis Areas for Resolu-
tion, 18 U. MICH. JL. REF. 575, 575 n.2 (1985).
5. Measures to limit the scope of products liability law are being urged in a number of indus-




For the most part, proponents of products liability and tort reform
have failed to take into account the interaction between the tort and
regulatory systems. These activists have failed to consider the federal
government's declining role in safety during the Reagan years and have
failed to weigh this factor in assessing the merits of reform proposals.
One set of proposed products liability reforms, however, forces an
examination of the relationship between the regulatory system and the
tort system. These proposals would increase greatly the influence of the
federal government over the products liability system by mandating
that, under the common law, federally issued product safety standards
are conclusive, or at least presumptive, evidence of adequate safety
measures. Under this view, a defendant in a products liability action
whose product complied with a federal safety standard would be pre-
sumed, or found as a matter of law, to have met all requirements of the
tort law and would be immune from civil liability.
These proposals would alter dramatically the longstanding judicial
treatment of regulatory and statutory standards as generally good mea-
sures of the minimum, but not the maximum, standard of care required
by the common law. The courts have treated violations of these stan-
dards as negligence per se (presumptive negligence), but they have
treated regulatory compliance as merely relevant evidence of due care,
deserving no special weight.
Proponents of these proposed reforms argue that the traditional ju-
dicial treatment of regulatory standards is neither sound, nor afforda-
ble. Proponents suggest two arguments in favor of the reforms. First,
the proponents claim that modern regulatory standards set safety re-
quirements that are sufficiently high to be presumed adequate for pur-
poses of the tort law.' Proponents argue that unlike criminal statutes,
6. See generally Henderson, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Design: A Pro-
posed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C.L. REv. 625 (1978) [hereinafter Henderson, Proposed Statutory
Reform].
Proponents of these reforms see the agencies as superior to the courts in determining product
safety questions. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices:
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1555, 1574-75 (1973) [hereinafter Henderson,
Conscious Design Choices]. Writing in 1973, Professor Henderson predicted that courts increas-
ingly would defer to federal regulatory standards because the agencies had a "tremendous advan-
tage" over the courts in answering the "polycentric question of '[h]ow much design safety is
enough?'" Id. at 1555; see also Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUm. L. REv. 277 (1985). In the Huber article, the author states:
Regulatory agencies are equipped to make the risk comparisons on which all progressive
transformation of the risk environment must be based. The courts are simply not qualified to
second-guess such decisions; when they choose to do so they routinely make regressive risk
choices. Requiring-or at least strongly encouraging-the courts to respect the comparative
risk choices made by competent, expert agencies would inject a first, small measure of ration-




which can be viewed as setting minimal standards to deter "severely
antisocial conduct," federal regulatory standards set a "reasonable stan-
dard of conduct for the manufacturer" that can be used to establish
suitable measures of safety under the tort law.7 Second, proponents
claim that the federal regulatory system will provide the kind of con-
crete, predictable liability standards demanded by a products liability
system now so wildly out of control.'
This Article challenges these views concerning the adequacy of
modern regulatory standards and the current condition of the products
liability system. It also considers some of the troubling ramifications
connected with the shifting of substantial control over the tort system
from the courts to the federal regulatory system-ramifications that the
reform proponents generally have ignored.
Part II of the Article describes the proposals: how they would limit
existing products liability law and depart from the traditional use of
standards to define tort liability. Part III examines whether the histori-
cal judicial approach to these standards remains valid in the modern
regulatory state and concludes that, at least in some respects, the tradi-
tional view is even more compelling today than it was in the past. Part
III also explores some of the disturbing, long-term consequences of the
proposed reforms, including the prospects of federalizing products lia-
bility law and making it increasingly vulnerable to shifts in federal reg-
ulatory policies, such as those that have occurred during the Reagan
Administration. Part IV then considers, and ultimately rejects, the pos-
sibility that, despite the troubling aspects of the proposed reforms, they
might be justified by the products liability "crisis." Finding no crisis,
the Article concludes in Part V that the proposals must be rejected.
7. Wilton & Campbell, Effect of Federal Safety Regulations on Crashworthiness Litigation,
22 TORT & INS. L.J. 554, 558 (1987).
8. See, e.g., Henderson, Proposed Statutory Reform, supra note 6, at 628-29; see also R.
EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABLITY LAw 93-118 (1980). Professor Epstein places special empha-
sis on the importance of "certainty and predictability" in his proposals for greater judicial defer-
ence to administrative safety standards. Id. at 192.
A recurring criticism made by tort scholars has been that the courts have failed to articulate
clear legal standards under strict products liability, particularly with respect to claims of design
defects and claims of inadequate warnings. See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect:
From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 600-02
(1980); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products
Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495, 513-17 (1976).
A good deal of the recent scholarship in the products liability field has been devoted to a
search for appropriate standards for design claims. For a list of the leading articles, see Twerski,
Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advanc-
ing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 521, 521 n.1 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter Twerski, Advancing Directed Verdicts].
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II. THE PROPOSED REFORMS: A DEPARTURE FROM COMMON-LAW
TRADITION
A. General Overview of the Proposals
Although the proposed reforms vary considerably both in the prod-
ucts they cover and in the weight they would assign to regulatory com-
pliance, all would require greater judicial acceptance of federal
regulations as standards of tort liability.
Some of the proposals are very broad in their coverage, applying
across the board to all regulated products.' Others are narrow, applying
only to particular products; for example, automobiles that comply with
motor vehicle safety standards issued by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA).' 0 Other proposed reforms are limited
to products that must be approved by the government prior to market-
ing; for example, pharmaceuticals approved by the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA)" and aircraft approved by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA).'
As mentioned above, the proposals also vary in the weight that
they would assign to regulatory compliance. The most radical proposals
would require courts to defer completely to the decisions of the agen-
cies, which comprehensively regulate products such as pharmaceuticals,
aircraft, medical devices, and pesticides.' In most of the proposals,
9. See H.R. 1115, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 206(b)(1), (3) (1987) [hereinafter H.R. 1115]; R
EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 83-84, 111-12, 192; Henderson, Proposed Statutory Reform, supra note
6, at 632-33.
10. See generally Wilton & Campbell, supra note 7; Note, Judicial Participation in the Es-
tablishment of Vehicle Safety Standards: A System in Need of Reform, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 902 (1981).
11. See Epstein, Legal Liability for Medical Innovation, 8 CARDozo L. REv. 1139, 1151
(1987); Foote, Coexistence, Conflict, and Cooperation: Public Policies Toward Medical Devices, 11
J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 501, 512 (1986); see also Keeton, Some Observations About the Strict
Liability of the Maker of Prescription Drugs: The Aftermath of MER/29, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 149,
152 (1968). Professor Keeton argues that while courts may treat general safety rules as minimal
safety standards for purposes of tort law, they should give greater weight to agency actions that
approve of specific products, such as the FDA's premarket approval of prescription drugs. In the
latter case, he argues that the agency's determination is directly at issue in the tort action and
deserves more deference. Id. at 153-54.
12. See H.R. 2238, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter H.R. 2238].
13. Huber, supra note 6, at 329-35. Professor Huber argues that the tort system should not
second guess agency determinations regarding these products, which create generalized "public"
health and safety risks, i.e., risks that are "centrally or mass-produced, broadly distributed and
largely outside the individual risk bearer's direct understanding." Id. at 277. In his view, these
products, which are "subject to the most searching and complete state and federal safety regula-
tion," should not be subject to evaluation under the tort law. Id. at 344.
Professor Keeton recommends giving conclusive weight to FDA approval of pharmaceuticals if
victims were entitled to institute proceedings for the withdrawal of drugs from the market. Keeton,
supra note 11, at 154. With respect to drugs withdrawn from the market, Keeton would impose
strict liability in order to induce manufacturers to take greater safety measures prior to marketing
their drugs. Id. Professor Epstein also would make compliance with FDA-approved warnings con-
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however, compliance with the regulatory standard would create only a
rebuttable presumption that the requisite common-law standard of care
has been met.' The effects of the presumption, however, can vary
somewhat under these proposals, depending on the burden imposed on
plaintiffs to overcome the presumption. One proposal would require the
plaintiff to establish that the regulatory standard was inadequate based
on "clear and convincing" evidence-a kind of super negligence stan-
dard.15 Another proposal would require the plaintiff to show that the
regulatory standard clearly was outdated, or was based on inaccurate
information supplied by the parties subject to the regulation.", A third
proposal would require the plaintiff to establish that the defendant was
negligent in failing to take greater precautions than those required by
the regulatory standard.'7
Increasingly, state tort reform statutes"" and proposed federal
products liability legislation include these proposals."" While the varied
nature of these proposed reforms makes it difficult to forecast precisely
their effects on products liability law,20 it is possible to foresee some
general impacts.
clusive in tort actions. Epstein, supra note 11, at 1151.
14. See, e.g., Foote, supra note 11, at 512 (stating that compliance with FDA requirements
should create a rebuttable presumption of nondefectiveness).
15. See Henderson, Proposed Statutory Reform, supra note 6, at 632 (stating that defend-
ants should not be liable for product designs that comply with federal standards unless plaintiff
proves by "clear and convincing" evidence that the standards were "inadequate to protect the class
of persons of which plaintiff is a member from unreasonable risks of injury or damage").
16. R. EPsTEIN, supra note 8, at 83-84, 111-12, 192.
17. See H.R. 1115, supra note 9, § 206(b)(1), (3)(c)(3) (stating that a plaintiff must show that
"a person exercising reasonable care could and would have taken additional precautions" or that
the manufacturer or product seller failed to inform the government of dangers material to the
claim that were known to them); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(a) (1983) (stating that a plaintiff must
prove "by a preponderance of evidence that a reasonably prudent product seller could and would
have taken additional steps").
18. See, e.g., Act of July 22, 1987, ch. 197, 1987 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 188-93 (West). The New
Jersey statute makes compliance with FDA-approved warnings presumptively adequate and limits
the availability of punitive damages when products approved by the FDA are challenged. See
states cited supra note 5. Other states also have enacted provisions creating a presumption that
products in compliance with government standards are reasonably safe and nondefective. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(a), (b) (1983) (discussed supra note 17); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (1980);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (Supp. 1987).
19. H.R. 2238, supra note 12; H.R. 1115, supra note 9.
20. In the past, the insurance industry has been reluctant to forecast that a strengthened
statutory compliance defense would have any effect on jury verdicts. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON
PRODucTs LIABILrrY, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PRODucTs LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT VII-38 (1978)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT ON PRODUcTs LIABILITY].
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B. Impacts on Products Liability Law
The proposals that would make regulatory compliance an absolute
defense to tort claims would have the most radical effect on the tort
system. Under these proposals, the regulatory system, in effect, would
preempt the tort system completely. The other proposals, which are the
focus here, would have a less radical, but nevertheless significant im-
pact on tort law. All the proposed reforms are intended to shrink the
scope of liability under current products liability law. They would ac-
complish this goal in two ways: First, by eliminating strict liability in
regulatory compliance cases; and second, by increasing substantially the
plaintiff's evidentiary burden in such cases.
1. Eliminating Strict Liability
By requiring, at the very least, that the plaintiff establish the de-
fendant's negligent conduct in failing to do more than was required by
the regulation, the proposed reforms would eliminate strict liability the-
ory in compliance cases. This return to negligence theory would erase
some of the major advantages that plaintiffs have gained in the devel-
opment of products liability law over the last twenty years.
Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement) view of
strict liability in products liability law, product sellers are liable for in-
juries caused by products that are in a "defective condition unreasona-
bly dangerous" to the user or consumer.21 Strict liability theory focuses
on the dangerousness of the product rather than the unreasonableness
of the seller's conduct, the focus in negligence theory.2 2
Courts have identified three ways in which a product can be defec-
tive: It can be mismanufactured, defective in design, or defective due to
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The Re-
statement provides in relevant part that "[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physi-
cal harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property." Id.
22. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 418, 573 P.2d 443, 447, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 229 (1978); Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 449, 479 A.2d 374, 385 (1984);
Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 465, 525 P.2d 125, 129 (1984); Davis v. Globe Mach. Mfg. Co., 102
Wash. 2d 68, 72, 684 P.2d 692, 696 (1984).
Some scholars have suggested that focusing on the product rather than the seller's conduct is
a distinction without a difference. See Birnbaum, supra note 8, at 601. Professor Birnbaum charac-
terized the shift in focus as "semantic gymnastics that confuse juries." Id. In her view, the jury
inevitably makes an assessment of negligence in these cases: "The jury may be charged to look at
the product, but as a common sense matter the jury, in fact, simply weighs the competing factors
put in evidence and then reaches a judgment about the judgment (i.e., conduct) of the manufac-
turer." Id. at 609-10. Nevertheless, courts continue to emphasize the importance of focusing on the
product, as opposed to the manufacturer's conduct. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593
P.2d 871, 877 (Alaska 1979); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 414 (Colo. 1986).
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inadequate warnings.2 3 Cases involving regulatory compliance generally
will concern the latter two claims of defect. As applied to warning and
design claims, strict liability theory overlaps with negligence theory24 in
that under both theories liability is based on a risk-utility balancing
test.25 The overlap, however, is not total. In many jurisdictions the
23. See, e.g., Feldman, 97 N.J. at 449, 479 A.2d at 385.
24. Sorting out the differences between strict liability and negligence, especially in design
cases, has been the source of much of the difficulty for the courts in their attempts to fashion a
strict liability standard. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 8, at 600-02; Wade, On the Effect in
Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734, 741-45
(1983).
In warning cases, most courts find little difference between negligence and strict liability. See,
e.g., Feldman, 97 N.J. at 450, 479 A.2d at 386. They also find, though, that the scope of the warn-
ing claim, under either theory, has grown significantly. Claims grounded on the premise that the
product provided inadequate warning to the user, which once might have been decided in favor of
the defendant as a matter of law, now go to the jury. See Laaperi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 787
F.2d 726, 731 (1st Cir. 1986). In Laaperi the court ruled that the assessment of the adequacy of
warnings is "almost always an issue to be resolved by a jury [because] few questions are 'more
appropriately left to a common sense lay judgment than that of whether a written warning gets its
message across to an average person.'" Laaperi, 787 F.2d at 731 (quoting MacDonald v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 140, 475 N.E.2d 65, 71 (1985)). Risks that were once thought
obvious as a matter of law now pose questions for the jury. See Laaperi, 787 F.2d at 730; Campo v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 207, 485 A.2d 305, 310 (1984) (finding the obviousness of
the risk to be just one factor in determining whether a warning was adequate). Courts typically
view the imposition of a warning as an inexpensive procedure, so that under a risk-utility assess-
ment the "balancing process will almost always weigh in favor of an obligation to warn." Moran v.
Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 543-44, 332 A.2d 11, 15 (1975).
25. Most courts have adopted a kind of risk-utility test for strict liability design claims that
closely resembles the test for negligence. See, e.g., Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 94-95
(Minn. 1987); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 386, 348 N.E.2d 571, 577-78, 384 N.Y.S.2d
115, 121 (1976); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Co., 282 Or. 61, 66, 577 P.2d 1322, 1325-26 (1978).
Many courts use the detailed list of considerations prepared by Dean Wade as the framework
for applying the tests, although there are variations on this list. Dean Wade proposed that the
following factors be considered by the court in determining whether a design claim should be sub-
mitted to the jury:
(1) the usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the public as a
whole;
(2) the safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the proba-
ble seriousness of the injury;
(3) the availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as
unsafe;
(4) the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without im-
pairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility;
(5) the user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product;
(6) the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or
of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions;
(7) the feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price
of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973) (foot-
note omitted). Other variations on the list also have been proposed. See Keeton, Manufacturer's
Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacturer and Design of Products, 20 SYRAcusE L.
Rav. 559, 565-66 (1969) (a four factor test); Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and
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strict liability theory imposes a less onerous burden of proof on plain-
tiffs than the negligence theory,2" an advantage that would be lost
under the proposed reforms.
Under some strict liability tests, for example, the manufacturer's
knowledge of its product's dangerous condition is assumed and the jury
is asked whether, with such knowledge, it was reasonable to place the
product on the market.2 7 Under negligence theory the plaintiff must es-
tablish that the defendant knew or should have known of the risks. 28
The proposed reforms would eliminate the defendant's constructive
knowledge by requiring, at a minimum, that the plaintiff establish the
defendant's negligence in failing to do more than required by the
standard.
Plaintiffs asserting strict liability also would lose other advantages
under the reforms. The reforms would eliminate the "consumer expec-
Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REv. 803, 818 (1976) (a
four factor test); Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function
and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109, 1370-71 (1974) (a thirteen
factor test).
26. See, e.g., Kallio, 407 N.W.2d at 92 (ruling that plaintiff need not establish as part of his
prima facie case in strict liability that there was a practical alternative design under a risk-utility
balancing test).
27. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974). The test is
one suggested by Dean Wade. See Wade supra note 25, at 834-35 (under which approach "scienter
[on the part of the manufacturer] is supplied as a matter of law, and there is no need for the
plaintiff to provide its existence as a matter of fact").
28. Dean Wade proposes that knowledge be imputed at the time the product was sold. See
Wade, supra note 24, at 760. With his suggestion that courts which have not yet applied strict
liability to design cases should consider treating them under negligence, Dean Wade seems to ac-
knowledge that such an approach cannot be distinguished from negligence. Id. at 760. Further, he
questions the continued usefulness of the assumed-knowledge test, which "always had overtones of
fiction, and, like all fictions ... can create difficulties if taken literally." Id. at 764.
Another approach, which would impute knowledge as of the time of trial, is a true strict liabil-
ity test. Under this approach, which was first proposed by Dean Keeton, the "magnitude of the
scientifically perceivable danger as it is proved to be at the time of trial" is weighed against the
benefits of the design. Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30,
38 (1973) (emphasis in original); see Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 209, 447
A.2d 539, 549 (1982) (rejecting a state-of-the-art defense and adopting a hindsight test in a warn-
ing claim against asbestos manufacturers); Carrecter v. Colson Equip., 346 Pa. Super. 95, 101, 499
A.2d 326, 330-31 (1985) (rejecting a state-of-the-art defense for warning and design claims); see
also Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhatten, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987) (rejecting state-of-the-
art defense).
Most courts, however, find that the strict liability and negligence theories overlap in warning
cases. See, e.g., Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). But see Feldman, 97 N.J. at 455-56, 479 A.2d at 388. Feldman
held that the burden of proof is on defendant to show that the risks were not knowable at the time
of manufacture, saying that "[iun strict liability warning cases, unlike negligence cases ... the
defendant should properly bear the burden of proving that the information was not reasonably
available or obtainable and that it therefore lacked actual or constructive knowledge of the de-
fect." Id.
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tation" test of liability recognized by the Restatement.9 This simple
test, applicable to products that fail to perform as intended or ex-
pected, relieves plaintiffs of the burden of establishing the elements of
the risk-utility test.30 The reforms also would eliminate strict liability
tests that shift the burden of establishing that the benefits of a design
outweigh the risks to the defendant, who is most knowledgeable about
the product. 1
In sum, while there is overlap in negligence and strict liability theo-
ries, strict liability offers clear advantages to plaintiffs, particularly with
respect to evidentiary burdens. These advantages would be lost under
the proposed reforms.
2. Complicating the Litigation of Product Claims
The proposed reforms would do more than erase strict liability and
replace it with negligence. They would introduce into compliance cases
difficult issues about the regulatory standard-its exact coverage, its
applicability to the case, its adequacy as a measure of due care. Courts
traditionally have not examined these issues closely; thus, they could
prove difficult for plaintiffs to address. For example, an initial question
in most cases would be whether the standard should apply at all, since
the agency may not have considered the issue at stake in the litigation.
This inquiry is crucial because a principal argument for increased judi-
cial deference to regulatory standards is agency expertise.3 2 If an agency
has not addressed specifically the matter before the court, the argument
29. Comment i to § 402A defines the term "unreasonably dangerous" by providing a test that
is commonly referred to as the consumer expectation test. The test provides that "[t]he article sold
must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary con-
sumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its charac-
teristics." RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 402A comment i. In applying the consumer expectation
test, however, courts often seem to resort to a risk-utility analysis. See, e.g., Estate of Ryder v.
Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 91 Wash. 2d 111, 587 P.2d 160 (1978), noted in Birnbaum, supra note
8, at 616-18.
30. See Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981).
31. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885 (Alaska 1979); Barker v. Lull
Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 426-27, 573 P.2d 443, 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 234 (1978); Ortho Pharma-
ceutical Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 413-14 (Colo. 1986). Scholars disagree on the impact of this
approach. Some argue that it makes "[a]ll product related accidents . . . presumptively actiona-
ble." Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for The Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. REV. 643, 651
(1978). Others conclude its effects are "de minimis." Birnbaum, supra note 8, at 607. Professor
Sheila Birnbaum points out that "[i]n fact, defense attorneys vigorously attempt to prove that a
challenged design is not defective regardless of how the burdens of proof are allocated by the
court." Id. Since plaintiffs must meet this burden of proof, the shift in the burden of persuasion, as
a practical matter, may not be "as dramatic a benefit as it might seem at first blush." Id. at 606;
see also Feldman, 97 N.J. at 455-56, 479 A.2d at 388 (putting the burden of proof on defendant
with respect to whether the product risks were knowable at the time of manufacture).
32. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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for judicial deference fails. 8
Even when an agency has addressed the matter before the court,
the scope of administrative regulations, particularly in the modern reg-
ulatory system, is often vague. 4 Standards may be drafted in broad,
general terms to allow the regulated industry some flexibility in meeting
its requirements.3 5 While desirable for a regulatory scheme, such stan-
dards may fail to provide the desired clarity as a basis of tort liability
and may introduce into tort litigation difficult questions about its appli-
cability to particular issues at stake. In addition, a standard may raise
questions as to whether in fact there has been compliance with its
terms.3 6 Issues such as these necessarily complicate litigation.
Another difficulty in assessing the scope of a regulatory standard
results from agency silence. Professor Clarence Morris identified this
problem many years ago in his seminal article on the use of administra-
tive safety standards in negligence cases. 7 He concluded that "courts
are likely to confuse administrative inaction with administrative judg-
ment, and then overgeneralize on the lack of value of proof of conform-
ity."3 8 This conclusion applies equally today.
The problem of agency silence arises in the following hypothetical:
A product in compliance with a regulation requiring that its label warn
33. Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence Actions, 28 TEx. L.
REV. 143, 212 (1949) (stating that "of course when the administrator has passed no judgment on
the problem before the court, the administrative process can furnish no acceptable criteria of
care"); see also Howard v. Faberge Inc., 679 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. App. 1984) (ruling that the lack
of federal standards could not be used to prove that the product was reasonably safe).
34. Note, Aircraft Crashworthiness: Should the Courts Set the Standards?, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 371, 398-99 (1986).
35. Id. at 399. An example of a broad standard is the FAA requirement that aircraft manu-
facturers must design aircraft "to give each occupant every reasonable chance of escaping serious
injury in a minor crash landing." 14 C.F.R. § 23.561(b) (1985). Another example is the labeling
requirement of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, which calls for "precautionary measures
describing the action to be followed or avoided." See Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079,
1084 n.14 (D.C. 1976).
36. See Burch, 366 A.2d at 1084 n.14 (in which the court assumed compliance with labeling
regulations, although generally phrased requirements of the regulation could have been interpreted
to require more specific warnings than actually were given).
37. Morris, supra note 33, at 162-63.
38. Id. at 167. One of Professor Morris' examples was the plaintiff who was injured when his
car ran into the base of a railroad crossing signal placed in the middle of the highway:
The public service commission had adopted a general regulation approving center installa-
tions and had approved the defendant's plans for erecting this particular signal. Had the
plaintiff been injured by collision with a train, the commission's judgment on the adequacy of
the signal as a warning would probably be controlling. But did the commission decide that the
signal was not an unreasonable traffic hazard? The defendant made no affirmative showing
that this problem was considered. The court held that the issue of negligence in the place-
ment of the signal was properly submitted to the jury and affirmed the judgement for the
plaintiff.
Id. at 162 (discussing McGettigan v. New York Cent. R.R., 268 N.Y. 66, 196 N.E. 745 (1935)).
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of risks X and Y is challenged in a tort action for failing to warn against
risk Z. It is unclear why the regulation does not cover risk Z, but there
are at least two possibilities. First, the agency may not have considered
risk Z at all (perhaps it was unknown at the time the regulation was
issued). Alternatively, the agency may have considered risk Z too insig-
nificant to warrant a warning.
It is clear that the product complies with the regulation, but it is
less clear that the regulation should govern the tort claim. If the agency
did not consider the risk and did not apply its expertise, its silence
should be meaningless in resolving the tort action. 9 If the agency did
consider the risk and found it too minimal to warrant a warning, it has
applied its expertise and, according to the proposed reforms, its deter-
mination that no warning is required should be presumptively or con-
clusively adequate for the purposes of tort law.
Too often, however, regulatory silence will be ambiguous and even
close scrutiny of the regulatory history may not reveal a clear answer. A
recent General Accounting Office study of several health and safety
agencies found that the basis for regulatory decisions frequently was
unclear. ° Because agencies do not intend or expect their regulations to
be used to define tort liability,"1 however, it is unsurprising when these
regulations are not drafted in a way that assists the courts. 2
Traditionally, courts have avoided the issue of agency silence
largely by ignoring it."3 They generally have allowed juries to consider
39. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
40. In a study of risk analyses by several federal health and safety agencies, the General
Accouting Office found that "the basis for regulatory decisions was unclear." GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, HEALTH RISK ANALySIS, TECHNICAL ADEQUACY IN THREE SELECTED CASES 3 (1987). With
respect to an FDA rule, the General Accounting Office concluded:
[T]he public is entitled to know the basis on which decisions are made and whether statutory
mandates are being followed. No documentation on the decisionmaking phase was available.
Therefore, FDA's steps in reviewing the options and arriving at a decision about the standard
are not clear and are not available for public review.
Id. at 35. With respect to the three agencies studied-the FDA, SHA, and the EPA-the report
found that the agencies "did not always clearly articulate the factors they considered, how they
considered them, or how their consideration of the several factors was integrated in decisionmak-
ing." Id. at 88.
41. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., May v. Parke, Davis & Co., 142 Mich. App. 404, 370 N.W.2d 371 (1985). The
court found that the FDA's rejection of a request for additional warnings could be given "little
weight because the FDA did not state its reasons for doing so. Without further evidence, the jury
could have improperly speculated on the FDA's reasoning." Id. at 422, 370 N.W.2d at 381.
43. A recent case on point is the highly controversial Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950
(3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981). Dawson was a crashworthiness case involving a
claim of defective automobile design. The court disallowed a regulatory compliance defense, indi-
cating that the regulatory standards set only minimum standards. The court, however, failed to
consider carefully whether in fact any federal motor vehicle standard applied directly to the design
claim at hand. A closer examination of the issue might have revealed that no standard did apply.
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regulatory compliance in product cases, even when it seems clear, or at
least highly likely, that the agency has not in fact ruled on the matter.
An example of this approach is Buccery v. General Motors Corp.," in
which the court ruled that a light pickup truck with no head restraint
"complied" with a federal motor vehicle standard that required head
restraints for passenger vehicles, but the standard did not apply to the
type of vehicle in question, a pickup truck.45 This approach treats fail-
ures to regulate products or risks as though they were agency decisions
that such products or risks are reasonably safe without regulation. The
reason for failing to regulate, however, may not be based on safety con-
siderations at all, but rather on the agency's determination that it did
not have sufficient resources to address the issue or that other matters
deserved higher priority."
A broad interpretation of regulatory compliance has serious ramifi-
cations for plaintiffs if the proposed reforms are adopted and regulatory
compliance is accorded greater weight. In crashworthiness cases, for ex-
ample, plaintiffs can expect the compliance defense to be raised fre-
quently because of fifty federal motor vehicle safety standards that
cover most aspects of a passenger car.4 7 The standards, however, do not
The plaintiff claimed that the automobile was defective in that it had a seventeen-inch gap in
the side of the door frame, which made it inadequate to withstand side impacts. Plaintiff argued
that a safer design would have included "a full, continuous steel frame extending through the door
panels, and a cross-member running through the floor board." Id. at 954. Defendant claimed as a
defense its compliance with existing federal crashworthy standards, including side door strength.
The court did not consider whether the agency had in fact addressed the issue of vehicle frames or
intended its crashworthy standards to provide a comprehensive set of standards with respect to all
second collision, side-impact situations. Had the court addressed this point, it may have concluded
that the standards did not cover the claim at issue. Federal automobile safety standards do not
address all aspects of crashworthiness, and "[a]lthough the agency's long-range goals include devel-
opment of. . .standards that would gauge occupant protection. . . in a variety of crash scenarios,
this is merely a goal and does not reflect standard setting at the present time." Note, The Rela-
tionship Between Federal Standards and Litigation in the Control of Automobile Design, 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 804, 831 (1982).
For criticism of Dawson, see Twerski, Advancing Directed Verdicts, supra note 8, at 524,
which cites Dawson as one of several "poorly reasoned, if not outrageous, appellate court decisions
that read the role of the jury in design litigation expansively." The point here, however, is not to
address the outcome of the case, rather the court's treatment of the compliance defense.
44. 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1976).
45. Id. at 537-41, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 607-09. The standard for passenger vehicles did not cover
multipurpose vehicles or pickup trucks.
46. Claybrook, Auto Protection: Beyond Federal Standards, TRIAL, Nov. 1980, at 38. Ms.
Claybrook, who was Administrator of the NHTSA during the Carter Administration, pointed out
that regulatory agencies must concentrate their resources on "high payoff requirements" and can-
not cover all aspects of the products that come within their jurisdiction, even though they may be
important and pose serious risks. Id. at 40; see also infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text
(concerning the push for expanding motor vehicle standards to cover minivans and light trucks).
47. Hearings on H.R. 1115 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection &
Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3 (1987)
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address every aspect of crashworthiness. For example, the gas tank of
the Ford Pinto, which exploded in rear-end collisions at low speeds,
"complied" with the federal fuel tank integrity standard. The standard,
however, dealt only with front-end collisions.,8 Under the proposed re-
forms, a broad application of the compliance defense, as in Buccery,
would have presumptively immunized the manufacturer from civil lia-
bility in this case.
A broad reading of regulations may be appropriate, so long as com-
pliance is given no special weight. Indeed, that compliance presently is
not weighed heavily may account for the failure of courts to consider
carefully the scope of regulations in such cases. If, however, under the
proposed reforms, regulations become a more important determinant of
liability, it will be incumbent on the courts to take a much closer look
at the issue of a regulation's applicability to the claim at hand. Al-
though some critics of the reforms have assumed that a broad applica-
tion of standards would continue despite the strengthened compliance
defense,49 it seems more likely that the issue of a standard's applicabil-
ity would become hotly contested in many, if not most, compliance
cases.
When the scope of regulations is not always clear, however, new
complexities are introduced into the litigation, especially for plaintiffs
who would be disadvantaged on this issue. Unlike defendants who are
likely to be quite knowledgeable about-perhaps having helped to for-
mulate-the federal regulations that govern their products, 0 plaintiffs,
as a general rule, will not have participated in the federal regulatory
process and will be unfamiliar with the regulations that become the fre-
quent subject of tort actions.'
This disadvantage to plaintiffs could be alleviated if the burden of
proof to establish the applicability of standards in compliance cases was
placed on defendants. This seems appropriate for two reasons: first, reg-
ulatory compliance is an affirmative defense and the party asserting it
[hereinafter Ditlow Testimony] (statement of Clarence M. Ditlow III, Director of the Center for
Auto Safety) (stating that "[a]n innovative defense lawyer. . . will be able to find [a federal motor
vehicle standard] to cover almost any automobile design liability case").
48. Id. The standard established a 30 mile per hour frontal crash requirement. The industry
lobbied against an agency requirement of 30 mile per hour rear crash protection until Congress
finally mandated it for 1977 model cars.
49. One author assumed that the defendant in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App.
3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981), a case involving an exploding Ford Pinto fuel tank in a rear-end
collision, would escape liability under a strengthened regulatory compliance defense, despite the
fact that the federal regulation provided only for front-end collision and said nothing about rear-
end collisions. Note, supra note 43, at 823; see also supra note 47 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 128-30, 152 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 133-36, 152 and accompanying text.
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should establish its applicability;5" and second, as mentioned earlier,
defendants are more knowledgeable about the regulations and thus are
in a better position than plaintiffs to bear the burden of proof on this
issue.53 In the end, however, the plaintiff would have to refute the de-
fendant's claim that a regulatory standard applies and thus could not
avoid the issue entirely.
This discussion reveals some of the difficulties inherent in trying to
mesh the regulatory and tort systems and demonstrates some of the
complexities that the proposed reforms would introduce into the litiga-
tion of compliance cases. Even the most preliminary inquiry concerning
the applicability of a standard would pose difficulties for plaintiffs. In
challenging the merits of standards, plaintiffs would face even greater
difficulties, particularly given the absence of clear decisionmaking by
agencies5 and plaintiffs' unfamiliarity with the regulatory process.55
Increased complexity in litigation runs completely counter to prod-
ucts liability developments over the past twenty years, which have been
aimed at streamlining product claims and relieving plaintiffs of eviden-
tiary burdens that are especially difficult for them to meet. In addition,
as shown in the next section of this Article, the proposed reforms also
run counter to the traditional common-law treatment of regulatory
standards in compliance cases.
C. Rejecting the Common-Law Treatment of Standards
For decades courts have used two criteria in determining whether
to adopt statutory and regulatory standards as tort liability standards:
First, whether adopting a standard would further the purpose of the
statute in question; and second, whether adopting a standard would be
generally consistent with common-law principles of liability. Applying
these criteria, courts seldom have found that these standards should be
viewed as setting the maximum standards of care and safety required
under the common law. 5 Instead, they have found these standards to
52. Professor Morris suggests that the defendant has the obligation to show affirmatively
that the problem at hand was considered by the agency. Morris, supra note 33, at 162; see also
supra note 38 (quoting a passage from Morris' article indicating that defendant bears the burden
of proof).
53. Courts often have justified placing the burden of proof on defendants when they have
superior knowledge of the facts. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 210 (4th ed. 1971);
see also supra notes 28, 31 and accompanying text (identifying cases in which courts have shifted
the burden of proof on issues to defendants under strict products liability).
54. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 133-36, 152 and accompanying text.
56. See 4 INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PROD-
UCTS LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY 137 (1977) [hereinafter PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LEGAL STUDY]. The legal study concluded that the "number of cases in which compliance has been
accepted as a complete defense is exceedingly small, so that is an overstatement to characterize
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be good measures of the minimum standard of care required.5 7 On this
basis courts have ruled, in general, that noncompliance with statutory
and regulatory standards constitutes negligence per se, or is presump-
tive of negligence,5" while compliance constitutes relevant evidence of
due care, but deserves no special weight.59
The proposed reforms reject the traditional approach to statutory
and regulatory standards-both the criteria that have served as the ba-
sis for adopting standards, as well as the judicial reluctance to adopt
standards as measures of the maximum care required by the common
law. The next section of this Article examines the origins and develop-
ment of this traditional judicial approach and how it would be changed
by the proposed reforms.
1. Adopting Standards to Further the Legislative Purpose
In Dean William Prosser's view, the most satisfactory justification
for using regulatory and statutory standards to define tort liability is
that their use can further the safety aims of the statutes in question. °
this position as even a 'minority rule.'" Id.
Only a handful of products liability cases has found statutory or regulatory compliance conclu-
sive on the issue of tort liability. See, e.g., Hunter v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 170 F. Supp.
352 (W.D. Mo. 1958); Lewis v. Baker, 243 Or. 317, 413 P.2d 400 (1966), overruled in McEwen v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522 (1974); Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 224 Pa. Super. 418, 307 A.2d 449 (1973) (per curiam).
57. This was true even of the earliest rulings on statutory compliance. See Smith v. Maine
Cent. R.R., 87 Me. 339, 32 A. 967 (1895):
But the statutes prescribing these special duties are little more than an affirmation of the
rules of the common law. They do not constitute the sole measure of duty. The common law
still requires the exercise of care and prudence commensurate with the degree of danger in-
curred. The statutes represent the minimum degree of care to be observed, and do not release
the company from the obligations to take such additional precautions as the peculiar circum-
stances of the case may demand.
Id. at 348, 32 A. at 970-71.
58. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTS
230-31 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS]. The majority view "probably" is
that an unexcused statutory violation should be deemed conclusive evidence of negligence, or neg-
ligence per se, although a substantial number of states treat such violations only as evidence of
negligence, which the jury may accept or reject in light of all the evidence. Id. at 230. California
has adopted a middle position, ruling that a violation creates a presumption of negligence which
can be rebutted. Id. Some courts give less weight to violations of administrative regulations. For
example, among those jurisdictions that view statutory violations as negligence per se, some view
administrative regulations as only evidence of negligence. Id. at 230-31. Although the reason for
this different approach is not entirely clear, it appears to reflect some skepticism that administra-
tive standards will be reasonable. It also reflects a desire to give the court more flexibility in using
them.
59. See cases cited infra notes 67, 97-104.
60. W. PROSSER, supra note 53, at 191. Dean Prosser rejected as "pure fiction" the presump-
tion adopted by some courts that the legislature intended to create a civil remedy even though the
statute provided only a criminal penalty and made no mention of a civil remedy. Id. In his view,
these statutes created no civil actions, but the courts could use the statutory standards in tort
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Indeed, this view has become the principal rationale6 1 for "borrowing"
standards from regulatory and criminal statutes, even though these
statutes themselves create no civil liability and are not intended for use
in the tort system.2 The Restatement adopts this justification,63 and its
criteria governing the use of statutory and regulatory standards to de-
fine tort liability assure that this purpose is served.6
The Restatement requires that two general conditions be met
before a statutory standard is adopted as a minimum or maximum
standard of care: (1) the person seeking protection under the standard
must fall within the class of persons that the legislature intended to
protect; and (2) the injury suffered must be of the type that the legisla-
ture intended to prevent. 5 These requirements tend to assure that the
actions if by doing so they would further the general safety aims of the statute. Id.
61. Other justifications also exist for using statutory or regulatory standards to define tort
liability. Courts have recognized that deference to standards may be warranted on the basis of the
expertise of the standard setting institution, whether it be the legislature or the administrative
agency. They have noted that the legislature, "by reason of its organization and investigating
processes," can be superior to the courts in establishing generalized rules of acceptable conduct.
Rudes v. Gottschalk, 159 Tex. 552, 555, 324 S.W.2d 201, 204 (1959); see also Morris, The Role of
Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM. L. Rav. 21, 47 (1949) [hereinafter Morris,
Criminal Statutes] (stating that because of their ability to gather facts, hold hearings, and debate
the issues, legislatures have "opportunities to arrive at informed value judgments superior to the
opportunities of judges and jurors"). With respect to administrative agencies, it is their technical
expertise that is valued. Morris, supra note 33, at 144 (stating that the use of administrative safety
measures "as tests of negligence will... harness any technical knowledge that may have gone into
their formulation"). Courts and scholars also recognize that the use of statutory and regulatory
standards to define common-law liability can add clarity and predictability to the tort system.
Morris, Criminal Statutes, supra, at 47 (stating that "a criminal proscription operates as a desira-
ble, more exact standard that smooths up civil procedure").
62. The practice of using standards is neither compelled nor even invited by the statutes or
regulations in question; it is solely a matter of judicial discretion. As the California Supreme Court
stated some forty years ago, "The decision as to what the civil standard should be still rests with
the court, and the standard formulated by a legislative body in a police regulation or criminal
statute becomes the standard to determine civil liability only because the court accepts it." Clink-
scales v. Carver, 22 Cal. 2d 72, 75, 136 P.2d 777, 778 (1943). The Restatement is in accord: "Since
the legislation has not so provided, the court is under no compulsion to accept it as defining any
standard of conduct for purposes of a tort action." RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 286 comment d.
63. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 286 comment d (stating that "[wihen the court does
adopt the legislative standard, it is acting to further the general purpose which it finds in the
legislation, and not because it is in any way required to do so").
64. See id. § 286.
65. Id. Section 286 provides:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a
legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively
or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.
Id. For an application of § 286, see Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671 (Alaska 1981); Stachniewicz
v. Mar-Cam Corp., 259 Or. 583, 488 P.2d 436 (1971); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 288
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adoption of the standard will further the purpose of the legislation, and
also that the agency or legislature has focused on the same interests
that are at stake in the litigation and applied its expertise to protect
those interests."6
In cases involving violations of safety standards, courts often have
tended to read statutory aims broadly, finding the plaintiff within the
protected class and the injuries within those sought to be prevented by
the statute."7 Therefore, the use of a standard to establish the tort lia-
bility of the violator would further the aim of the statute by creating an
additional incentive to comply with the statute; indeed, the risk of in-
curring tort liability may provide a far greater incentive for compliance
than the risk of incurring a penalty under the statute.6 "
In compliance cases, on the other hand, adopting a regulatory stan-
dard may shield the defendant from liability. It is less evident that such
use of standards would promote the safety aims of the statute. Courts
have examined the legislative purpose of a wide array of consumer
(which is a corollary to § 286 and identifies those statutory or legislative standards that are not
intended to protect individuals from harm and thus should not be borrowed under the criteria of
§ 286); id. § 288C comment a (providing that before a statutory standard is adopted as a maxi-
mum standard of care in a compliance case, the court should determine that the standard meets
the criteria of § 286).
66. It should be noted, however, that these requirements assure only that the same interests
are at stake in both fora; they do not assure that the issues are exactly the same. Thus, they do not
obviate the problem of determining the standard's applicability to the issue before the court. See
supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954). Ney found that
leaving the car key in the ignition in violation of a statute was prima facie evidence of defendant's
negligence in a claim for damages caused by a thief who stole the car and negligently ran into
plaintiff's car. The case has been cited as an "extreme" example of a broad statutory interpretation
that would include "all risks which would occur to anyone. . . following the violation." PROSSER &
KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 58, at 227.
68. The enormous discrepancy between tort liability and statutory fines has been demon-
strated repeatedly. For example, in MERI29, a drug used to reduce cholesterol caused numerous
serious side effects. The manufacturer sought to withhold this information from the public. The
companies pleaded no contest to criminal fraud charges and were fined $80,000. J. BRAITHWArrE,
CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 60-64 (1984). Over 500 products liability suits
stemming from the same conduct are believed to have cost the companies $200 million. Id. at 64.
Consider also another recent example in which Eli Lilly & Co. was fined $25,000 for failing to
report overseas deaths associated with the use of its arthritis drug, Oraflex. See Metzenbaum, Is
Government Protecting Consumers?, TRIAL, April 1986, at 22, 26. In a tort claim brought against
Eli Lilly & Co. for a death caused by Oraflex, the jury returned a verdict against the defendant for
$6 million. Borum v. Eli Lilly & Co., Wash. Post, Nov. 25, 1983, at D8, col. 1 (D. Ga. Nov. 24,
1983).
The largest fine ever imposed for a violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act was $2
million, which was paid by Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp. for selling a bogus fruit drink as apple juice.
Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1987, at H2, col. 1. The fine was "more than six times the largest ever paid
under the 1938 food and drug law." Id. These examples suggest how great the gap is between
statutory fines and tort liability and how relatively weak the deterrent effects of the regulatory
system are compared to the products liability system.
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safety statutes and found no express or implied aim to set safety stan-
dards adequate for purposes of the common law;6" some statutes make
explicit the contrary aim.70
Treating compliance as an adequate defense in tort claims, how-
ever, can provide an incentive to comply with statutes, which furthers
the statutes' safety aims in the same way that restating violations as
negligence per se furthers safety aims.7 1 Possible adverse effects, how-
ever, may result from treating compliance as an adequate defense in all
cases. Making the compliance defense stronger could actually discour-
age safety by allowing manufacturers to "sit back" and rely on stan-
dards that are inadequate.72 Manufacturers often resist implementing
new safety measures, though they are readily available in the industry,
until government standards compel their adoption.73 This resistance
69. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1543 (D.C. Cir.) (stating that "federal
legislation has traditionally occupied a limited role as the floor of safe conduct; before transform-
ing such legislation into a ceiling on the ability of states to protect their citizens ... courts should
wait for a clear statement of congressional intent to work such an alteration" (emphasis in origi-
nal)) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1028 (1st
Cir. 1973) (finding that since "the Flammable Fabrics Act did not provide private civil remedies
and does not preclude state development of such remedies, the states are not limited to applying
the federal ... standards in civil cases"); see also Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d
402 (1st Cir. 1968). The court in Hubbard-Hall stated:
The approval of the label given by the Department of Agriculture merely satisfied the condi-
tions laid down by Congress [under the Federal Insecticide Act] for the shipment of the prod-
uct in interstate commerce. Neither Congress nor the Department explicitly or implicitly
provided that the Department's approval of the label carried with it as a corollary the pro-
position that defendant had met the possibly higher standard of due care imposed by the
common law of torts ....
Id. at 405; see also Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1085 (D.C. 1976) (finding "nothing
in the statute itself [the Federal Hazardous Substances Act] or the legislative history which im-
plies that Congress intended to limit a seller's common law 'duty to warn' "); Wilson v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 64, 577 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1978) (finding nothing in the Federal Aviation
Act or its legislative history to indicate congressional intent that FAA approval of an aircraft de-
sign should be a complete defense to a tort claim based on defective design).
The agencies also do not expect their regulations to be used as the upper limits of responsibil-
ity under the tort law. See, e.g., 43 Fed. Reg. 4214 (1978) (the FDA's statement of basis and pur-
pose in support of a labeling rule for oral contraceptives indicated no intent to preempt state law
tort standards).
70. See, e.g., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, § 108(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c)(1982) (providing that "compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under
this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under common law"). For a similar
provision, see the Consumer Product Safety Act, § 25(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1982).
71. It has been argued that the safety interests of consumers would be served generally by
allowing a statutory compliance defense because it would provide an additional economic incentive
to comply with the standards. FIN A REPORT ON PRODucTs LiAmUrrY, supra note 20, at VII-38.
72. Id. at VII-39 to -40; see Johnson, Products Liability "Reform": A Hazard to Consumers,
56 N.C.L. Rav. 677, 687-89 (1978); see also infra notes 197-207 and accompanying text (regarding
the possible negative effects on the standard setting process if courts were to give greater weight to
regulatory compliance).
73. In Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 740 (Minn.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
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could be encouraged by a strengthened compliance defense. In addition,
manufacturers would be motivated to increase their already substantial
influence on the regulatory process to assure that standards are not up-
graded or their requirements made too onerous (a topic developed in
Part II). In sum, the reforms could stifle improvements in safety, rather
than fulfill the safety aims of the statute. 4 Furthermore, strengthening
the compliance defense is not essential to spur regulatory compliance
because the judicial treatment of statutory and regulatory violations
provides sufficient incentive to do so."'
2. Adopting Standards Consistent with Common-Law Principles
In general, courts borrow regulatory and statutory standards as
measures of tort liability only when they reflect common-law standards
of liability. Courts avoid using standards that depart from the common
law, either by expanding 6 or contracting it."7
To assure consistency with common-law principles, the Restate-
ment provides considerable flexibility in the adoption of statutory and
regulatory standards as standards of tort liability. In the case of statu-
tory violations, for example, it provides that courts should not adopt
standards that are palpably unreasonable.78 Few statutory standards set
requirements that make compliance unreasonable. Compliance, how-
ever, may be unreasonable when the standards become obsolete 7 9 as
921 (1980), the court found that defendant had decided not to use available flame-retardant mater-
ials until required by federal law in order to avoid the additional costs. In Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 775, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 361 (1981), the evidence showed that Ford was
unwilling to enhance the safety of its gas tank despite the requirements of anticipated federal
regulations and the fact that inexpensive "fixes" were available. Ford was willing to defer the
safety change until the regulation was actually in effect.
74. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 459, 479 A.2d 374, 390 (1984)
(finding it would be "anomalous" and would "undercut" the primary safety aims of the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act to read the Act as requiring drug manufacturers only to stay within existing
regulatory requirements and not to provide warnings even though dangers became known).
75. See supra note 58.
76. See, e.g., Zeni v. Anderson, 397 Mich. 117, 137, 243 N.W.2d 270, 280 (1976) (stating that-
"[w]hile some ... cases seem to speak of negligence per se as a kind of strict liability ... there
are a number of conditions that attempt to create a more reasonable approach than would result
from an automatic application of a per se rule").
77. Morris, Criminal Statutes, supra note 61, at 45-46.
78. Comment d to Restatement § 286 provides that the court should not treat an "entirely
unreasonable" statute as a standard of negligence. It uses as an example of such a statute a six
mile per hour speed limit enacted in 1908 and not repealed for six decades. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 21, § 286 comment d.
79. In referring to the six mile per hour speed limit, the Restatement notes that it will be
"relatively infrequent [that] legislation directed to the safety of persons or property will be so
obsolete, or so unreasonable." Id. But see W. PROSSER, supra note 53, at 200 (stating that "[a]
troublesome problem is presented by the deplorable array of trivial, obsolete, or entirely unreason-
able legislation ... which persist in our statute books").
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when the court's adoption of criminal or regulatory standards would
impose duties greater than those recognized under the common law-a
result the Restatement seeks to avoid.
The Restatement also identifies a number of circumstances in
which statutory violations may be excused under the tort law.80 The
Restatement's list of excuses, which is not exhaustive, recognizes situa-
tions in which it would be unreasonable to expect compliance with a
statutory standard, such as when a party either is incapacitated or faces
an emergency.8 1 Again, the adoption of the statutory standard in such
circumstances would be inconsistent with the fault-based, common-law
system and therefore is inappropriate. A court has the alternative either
to adopt the excuses from the Restatement's list,82 or to interpret the
statute as not covering the particular circumstances."
In some limited situations, however, the Restatement does en-
courage the adoption of standards when the effect is to alter the com-
mon law. This result occurs, for example, when criminal and regulatory
statutes impose absolute duties on the actor to comply with their provi-
sions.8 ' In these circumstances, the courts may refuse to excuse viola-
tions of these standards for civil purposes, in effect using the standards
to create strict liability." Courts followed this approach, for example, in
the early suits involving violations of pure food statutes, which made
them among the first product cases to apply strict liability.8 6 In these
80. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 288A.
81. Id. Section 288A of the Restatement provides:
(1) An excused violation of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation is not
negligence.
(2) Unless the enactment or regulation is construed not to permit such excuse, its viola-
tion is excused when
(a) the violation is reasonable because of the actor's incapacity;
(b) he neither knows nor should know of the occasion for compliance;
(c) he is unable after reasonable diligence or care to comply;
(d) he is confronted by an emergency not due to his own misconduct;
(e) compliance would involve a greater risk of harm to the actor or to others.
Id.
82. See, e.g., Byrne v. City & County of San Francisco, 113 Cal. App. 3d 731, 17 Cal. Rptr.
302 (1980).
83. See, e.g., Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 594, 177 P.2d 279, 286
(1947) (Traynor, J., dissenting in part) (stating that "[i]f there is sufficient excuse or justification,
there is ordinarily no violation of a statute, and the statutory standard is inapplicable"); Zeni, 397
Mich. at 144, 243 N.W.2d at 283 (stating that "the statute itself provides not only a legislative
standard of care which may be accepted by the court, but a legislatively mandated excuse as
well"); see also Tedla v. Ellman, 280 N.Y. 124, 19 N.E.2d 987 (1939).
84. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 288A; see also supra note 81 (setting forth the text of
§ 288A).
85. See W. PROSSE, J. WADE & V. SCHwARTz, TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 246 (7th ed.
1982) (listing statutes that courts have interpreted as not permitting excused violations, including
child labor acts, pure food acts, and workplace safety statutes).
86. Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119 N.W. 428 (1909); Doherty
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cases the use of statutory standards to expand the scope of tort liability
was justified on the ground that it furthered the statutory purpose.
On other occasions, courts borrow standards to create new tort lia-
bilities8 Sensing the evolutionary nature of the common law, 8 courts,
on rare occasions, have been willing to "transplant" to the tort system
regulatory or statutory standards of safety that have yet to be recog-
nized under the common law.' Despite expanding the common law,
such use of regulatory standards is not inconsistent with common-law
tradition when the standards are not burdensome 0 and the imposition
of liability for their violation creates no unfair surprise.9 1
Rather than expanding the common law, compliance cases tend to
contract it through the adoption of standards that are inadequate mea-
sures of due care and safety. The Restatement seeks to avoid this result
by encouraging an evaluation of every standard's adequacy in light of
v. S.S. Kresge Co., 227 Wis. 661, 278 N.W. 437 (1938).
87. Most frequently, courts use statutory or regulatory standards as just one factor in recog-
nizing new tort duties. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 138,
375 N.E.2d 65, 70 (taking the FDA's patient package insert rule into account in ruling that drug
manufacturers have a common-law obligation to provide the inserts), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920
(1985); see also Morris, Criminal Statutes, supra note 61, at 24 (discussing cases in which the
court has looked to the criminal law as one of several factors in determining whether to recognize a
new common-law duty). But see infra note 89 (citing cases in which the statutory standard has
been the sole basis for creating a new common-law duty).
88. The willingness to expand common-law duties through the use of statutory standards is
consistent, of course, with the general willingness of courts to recognize new duties under the com-
mon law in response to changing societal norms. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.
3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (creating a new "market share" theory of liability for
manufacturers of generic drugs when plaintiffs cannot identify the makers of the drugs that caused
their injuries), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69
Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (recognizing a parent's right to recover for her own physical injuries that
resulted from observing a traumatic injury to a child); Kelley v. R. G. Indus., Inc., 304 Md. 124,
497 A.2d 1143 (1985) (recognizing for the first time a strict liability claim against a handgun manu-
facturer for injuries caused by criminal use of the gun).
89. See, e.g., Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Wis.) (find-
ing that the violation of an FDA regulation requiring patient package inserts for oral contracep-
tives created a new common-law duty for prescription drug manufacturers to provide warnings
directly to consumers), modified, 532 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 II.
2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954) (discussed supra note 67).
90. Courts may view regulatory and statutory standards as reflecting an assessment by the
legislature that compliance is practicable and would not impose undue costs. Clarence Morris
states that "[a] tort court creating novel liabilities runs a risk of demanding impractical or undesir-
able safeguards. However, [safety] statutes ... are not likely to interdict conduct which most
people cannot forego in everyday affairs." Morris, Criminal Statutes, supra note 61, at 23.
91. A statutory standard generally is known to those subject to its provisions. Thus, "[a] man
held liable in a damage suit for breach of a criminal statute is not likely to be caught innocently off
guard." Id.
In earlier decades, some courts used statutory standards as a basis for rejecting harsh no-duty
or immunity rules under existing common-law principles. Id. at 23-24. As Professor Morris noted,
"when a no-duty rule would produce an unappealing result, some courts are likely to hold that civil
liability follows criminal responsibility into areas of common law immunity." Id. at 23.
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the particular circumstances of each case.2 While recognizing that stan-
dards can be found adequate as a matter of law,93 the Restatement an-
ticipated that few cases would arise in which courts would find that the
circumstances warranted the adoption of a standard as conclusively or
presumptively adequate. 4
Because the circumstances of cases vary, courts often find that the
exigencies of a case fall outside the "normal"95 or "optimum" 96 circum-
stances covered by the statute. In product cases, courts may find that
the product poses special risks and that the broad regulation covering
many products does not account for those special risks. Courts also
92. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 288C comment a. The Restatement provides:
Where there are no. . .special circumstances, the minimum standard prescribed by the legis-
lation or regulation may be accepted by the triers of fact, or by the court as a matter of law,
as sufficient for the occasion; but if for any reason a reasonable man would take additional
precautions, the provision does not preclude a finding that the actor should do so.
Id. (emphasis added).
93. Id. § 288C. Although § 288C emphasizes that compliance does not constitute due care if
circumstances call for further precautions, comment a provides that, absent such circumstances,
"the minimum standard prescribed by the legislation or regulation may be accepted by the triers
of fact, or by the court as a matter of law, as sufficient for the occasion." Id. § 288C comment a.
Early scholarly articles also accepted the view that standards could serve as conclusive mea-
sures of due care. See Morris, supra note 33, at 167 (stating that "when administrative judgment
has been passed, proof of conformity should have as much force to protect defendants from liabil-
ity as does proof of departure to establish negligence"); Morris, Criminal Statutes, supra note 61,
at 44 (stating that "in the absence of affirmative reasons for rejection of the criminal proscription,
the courts should assume that the proscription will function properly as a standard for judging
care"); see also W. PROSSER, supra note 53, at 164 (stating that there will be cases involving "nor-
mal situations, clearly identical with those contemplated [by the statute], in which it may be found
that the statute defines the actor's duty, and that nothing more is required").
94. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 288C comment a. The Restatement views the standards
as minimum standards and therefore adequate only for the "ordinary situations contemplated by
the legislation." Id. The text of § 288C contains no statement that compliance is per se due care,
but rather that compliance "does not prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable man
would take additional precautions." Id. § 288C. The thrust of the section and comment is that
compliance will rarely be a conclusive defense.
95. See W. PROSSER, supra note 53, at 164 (stating that statutory standards should be ap-
plied to "normal situations, clearly identical with those contemplated [by the statute or regula-
tion]"); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 288C comment a (stating that a statute or
regulation is normally "applicable to the ordinary situations contemplated by the legislation").
96. See Morris, Criminal Statutes, supra note 61, at 47. As Professor Morris noted, the "op-
timum conditions are seldom present in accident cases." Id.
97. Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079 (D.C. 1976). The court found the statute in
question, the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, covered over 300,000 products, many of which
may involve special dangers which would require more detailed and specific instructions than
the general warnings prescribed by the Act. In light of the extreme flammability of [the prod-
uct at issue], we do not agree that there were no special circumstances here which may have
required a higher degree of care.
Id. at 1085; see also O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 817 (D. Kan. 1985) (jury
allowed to find in case of toxic shock syndrome (TSS) that FDA-approved warning was not ade-
quate when defendant's superabsorbent tampon posed greater risks of TSS than all other
tampons), modified, 821 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1987).
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may find that the manufacturer's conduct undermined the effectiveness
of the agency's product safety standard; for example, when a manufac-
turer withholds vital information from the regulatory agency, 8 or pro-
motes its products in ways that dilute the effects of the government-
approved warning.9 In these cases the agency's regulation does not ad-
dress the underlying conduct that is at the heart of the tort claim. To
give special weight to regulatory compliance in these cases would run
counter to the statute's safety aims.100
Courts may find that circumstances have changed since the stan-
dard was issued and that it has become obsolete. Although it is rare for
rules to become too strict as they grow old,10' it is not unusual for them
to become too lax as they grow old.102 Agencies and legislatures are una-
ble to respond rapidly to new information and new technology;103 hence
their standards quickly can become outdated and poor measures of de-
fendants' duties.0 4 In all cases of special circumstances, however, the
98. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967) (in which
misrepresentations were made to the FDA to obtain approval for new drug, MER/29, which caused
cataracts); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967);
Borum v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 83-00-38, slip op. (D. Ga. Nov. 1983) (in which the defendant with-
held information about deaths associated with use of Oraflex); see also cases discussed supra note
68.
99. For an early case in which the promotion of a product undermined the government-
approved warning, see Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945), in which the
Surgeon General's approval of a warning on a highly dangerous cleaning fluid was not conclusive
when the warning was diluted by promotion of the product under the name "Safety-Kleen." See
also Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. App. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973)
(involving dispute over promotion of antibiotic, Chloromycetin, which diluted FDA-approved
warnings); Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964), aff'd, 249 Cal. App. 2d 822,
58 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1967); Whitley v. Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204, 210 S.E.2d 289 (1974); Incollingo v.
Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
100. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984) (dicta).
101. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1027 (1st Cir. 1973) (in which
flammability standards remained unchanged for over fourteen years, allowing flannelette material
that could burst into flames within two seconds of contact with electric range to stay on the
market).
103. See infra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
104. See Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658-59 (1st Cir. 1981) (in
which manufacturer had information in 1970 about risks of its oral contraceptive that was not
available when the FDA regulation was issued in 1968); see also Feldman, 97 N.J. at 438, 479 A.2d
at 379 (documenting defendant drug manufacturer's early awareness of risks and its requests that
the FDA require a warning; defendant, however, failed to issue any warnings until the FDA finally
required them, after plaintiff's injury).
Consider also the testimony of Clarence Ditlow III, Director of the Center for Auto Safety:
"Present motor vehicle safety standards are woefully in need of strengthening and revision. With
the delays in revising old standards and promulgating new ones, few significant changes have been
made in motor vehicle safety standards in the 1970's." Nominations-June: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1976). This failure to update motor vehicle
standards has continued through the 1980s, despite changes in auto designs that call for the
strengthening of some standards. See infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
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courts allow the jury to consider the defendant's compliance, despite its
questionable merit.
Even when the circumstances of the case are normal and the regu-
lation has not become outdated, however, modern courts still are reluc-
tant to adopt regulatory standards as conclusively or presumptively
adequate under the common law.10 5 In individual cases, courts may
weigh compliance heavily, especially if the plaintiff's case is weak.10 6
Even in these cases, however, courts acknowledge the general rule that
the standards are not presumptive or conclusive measures of tort obli-
gations. 0 7 This pervasive judicial attitude reflects a general skepticism
about regulatory standards and an uncertainty about their sufficiency
as standards of tort liability. The underpinnings for this skepticism will
be explored in Part III.
3. Rejecting the Traditional Approach to Standards
The proposed reforms reject both of the general criteria by which
courts now determine whether to adopt statutory and regulatory stan-
dards as standards of tort liability.10 8 The reforms also reject the notion
that standards should be used only when consistent with existing com-
mon-law principles. 109 The proposed reforms would shrink common-law
liability by eliminating strict products liability" and by increasing
105. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.) (finding that, absent
federal preemption, a warning prescribed by the Environmental Protection Agency is not necessa-
rily adequate under state tort law because the purposes of the federal statute and state tort law
may be quite distinct and the relevant factors may be weighed differently under each law), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 375
N.E.2d 65 (allowing jury to evaluate adequacy of wording of an FDA-approved warning on oral
contraceptives), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
106. Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976) (summary judgment for
defendant when aircraft complied with FAA regulations and plaintiff failed to establish that an
alternative design was available at the time of manufacture); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282
Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978) (finding that plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case when aircraft
complied with FAA regulations and plaintiff failed to establish a feasible alternative design). In
both cases, the courts accepted the view that the FAA standards were the minimum requirements,
but found plaintiffs' cases inadequate when they failed to establish more stringent standards as an
alternative. Bruce, 544 F.2d at 446; Wilson, 282 Or. at 64, 69-71, 577 P.2d at 1325, 1327-28; see
also Chambers v. G. D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 383-84 (D. Md. 1975) (directed verdict for
defendant when defendant complied with oral contraceptive warning prescribed by FDA and
plaintiff's case was weak with respect to scientific knowledge of the risk and causation); Johnson v.
American Cyanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, 718 P.2d 1318 (1986) (trial court should have directed a
verdict because Sabin oral polio vaccine complied with FDA regulations and also was approved
widely by medical and public health communities nationally and internationally). Neither Cham-
bers nor Johnson, however, adopted the view that compliance with FDA regulations alone was
sufficient to bar a tort claim.
107. See supra note 106.
108. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
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plaintiffs' evidentiary burdens in compliance cases.11' Further, proposed
reforms which reject the view that standards should be used only to
further the purpose of the statute fail to account for a regulation issued
with neither the intent nor the expectation that it would be used to
determine tort liability.
That courts would ignore the statutory or regulatory purpose is one
of the most disturbing aspects of the proposals. The proposed reforms
would transform regulatory standards already on the books, which have
been neglected for decades by courts and agencies alike, into presump-
tively or conclusively adequate standards of care. Why, one must ask,
should the court presume that a standard is sufficient for the tort sys-
tem if the agency on whose expertise the court is relying has not estab-
lished that the standard is adequate?
III. THE PROPOSED REFORMS IN THE MODERN REGULATORY ERA
The proposed reforms are based on the premise that federal regula-
tory agencies set sufficiently high standards of safety for the tort system
and that they would continue to do so if the reforms were adopted.
Inherent features of the modern regulatory process, however, belie
these assumptions. First, the regulatory process presently is influenced
heavily by regulated industries, which seek minimal safety standards. If
the reforms were enacted, these industries would have even more at
stake in the regulatory process and more incentive to influence it. Sec-
ond, the federal regulatory system is incapable of keeping product
safety standards up-to-date. Low agency budgets, rapidly changing
technology, and expanding scientific knowledge combine to make this
problem even greater in the modern regulatory era than in the past.
Since the Reagan Administration began in 1981, some of these weak-
nesses in the regulatory system, particularly with respect to industry
influence and low agency budgets, have become even more pronounced.
As a result, some experts question the wisdom of allowing regulatory
standards to set the outer limits of manufacturer responsibility under
the common law."2
111. See supra notes 32-55 and accompanying text.
112. PRODUcTs LLkIBiTY LEGAL STUDY, supra note 56, at 131. The report urged rejection of a
strengthened statutory compliance defense on several grounds: (1) standards can turn out to be
"rubber-stamped" versions of existing industry standards; (2) standards "cannot comprehend
every circumstance in which the product may be dangerous in normal use;" and (3) standards
become "obsolete quickly." Id. The report concluded that "[t]hese inherent characteristics present
a compelling argument against treating safety standards as anything more than a minimum or
floor, below which product-related dangers are intolerable." Id. In its final report, the Interagency
Task Force on Products Liability noted these arguments and rejected strengthening the statutory





A troubling aspect of strengthening the regulatory compliance de-
fense is the enormous influence that industry has on the regulatory pro-
cess, compared to the relatively weak influence of public interest
groups. The disparity in influence between industry and consumer
groups, however, does not affect all standards that courts might adopt.
For example, traffic rules, often borrowed as standards for tort cases,
are not as likely to raise this concern because they generally are broadly
applicable to the entire population and no special interest group is
likely to have pressed unduly for a particular outcome."' Business in-
fluence, however, pervades industry regulation."" Several factors con-
tribute to business' predominance in the modern regulatory system,
including agency dependence on industry data and expertise to carry
out regulatory responsibilities, and the unparalleled wealth of resources
that business groups can devote to the process.
1. Business Control of Vital Information
Industry often controls indispensible data about the nature and ex-
tent of the safety problem that an agency is attempting to address, as
well as information about the technology and costs of reducing or elimi-
nating the risk.11 5 The agencies often must place "substantial reliance"
on industry data, which is not submitted under oath or subject to cross-
examination in a rulemaking setting."6 Industry often overestimates
the costs, yet agencies rely on the data.11  As a result, "agency choices
predictably reflect the perspectives of industry interests."1 "
Even those agencies with the most pervasive regulatory role over
industry, such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the
113. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 288C comment a. The Restatement uses only traffic and
railroad crossing rules as illustrations. Of course, industry influence should not be discounted.
Some traffic rules could be expected to trigger considerable industry influence on the regulatory
process; for example, those governing trucking or the transportation of certain hazardous
substances.
114. See D. BOLLIER & J. CLAYBROOK, FREEDOM FROM HARM: THE CIVILIZING INFLUENCE OF
HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 189 (1986) (stating that "by far the most influ-
ential force in the regulatory process is the political resistance of the affected industries").
115. Id. at 193; see also Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Partici-
pation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. L.J. 525, 529-30 (1972); Tobias, Of Public Funds
and Public Participation: Resolving the Issue of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public Partici-
pants in Administrative Proceedings, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 906, 908 (1982).
116. Claybrook, Auto Protection: Beyond Federal Standards, TRIAL, Nov. 1980, at 38, 40.
117. Costle, supra note 1, at 415 n.20 (citing examples when both industry and government
have overestimated the costs of regulation in the environmental area).
118. Tobias, Great Expectations and Mismatched Compensation: Government Sponsored
Public Participation in Proceedings of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, 64 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1101, 1103 (1986).
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Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (two agencies that arguably de-
serve more judicial deference in tort actions because they regulate so
comprehensively),11 must rely heavily on the information and data sup-
plied by the regulated industries. Indeed, when the regulatory scheme is
more comprehensive, the regulatory job for the agency is larger and it
may have to depend more on industry.1 20 For example, the FAA, in cer-
tifying the design, manufacture, and airworthiness of an aircraft, re-
quires the applicant to conduct the tests to assure compliance with
FAA airworthiness requirements."' 1 In developing new regulations, the
FAA often calls upon industry advisory committees, which have sub-
stantial influence on the agency.122 Similarly, the FDA must rely on the
regulated industry for data. In the past few years, the failure of compa-
nies to provide crucial data to the FDA for a series of drugs-Merital, 2 3
Oraflex,12 4 Zomax,115 and Selacryn' 20-has been disastrous for consum-
119. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (describing proposals that would make
conclusively or presumptively adequate under the tort law only agency decisions concerning
premarket approval of products).
120. See Keeton, supra note 11, at 154 (in which Dean Keeton concluded that, with respect
to the FDA, because of the development of so many new drugs, "it is unrealistic to rely on a busy
administrative agency to assure that proper precautions have been taken").
121. 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.33, 21.35 (1988). Further, with only 400 engineers, the FAA must turn to
private individuals appointed to represent the FAA in the certification process. Those individuals
appointed are generally employees of aircraft manufacturers. See General Aviation Accident Lia-
bility Standards: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 60-62 (1986) (letter from Consumers Union,
Consumer Federation of America, Public Citizen Congress Watch, and United States Public Inter-
est Research Group).
122. See Airline Safety: The Shocking Truth, DISCOVER, Oct. 1986, at 30, 48 (describing the
FAA's reluctance to strengthen crashworthiness standards and its willingness to postpone standard
setting procedures in favor of appointing committees, which make only the most modest recom-
mendations after years of consideration); see also Doggett, Aircraft Post-Crash Fires, TRIAL, Nov.
1987, at 30, 32 (describing the use of an industry task force on postcrash fire which concluded that
preventing such fires was not cost effective).
123. In the case of Merital, an antidepressant, the FDA, despite indications in its own files
and in the medical literature of severe allergic reactions, approved the drug without providing a
warning of such reactions. Mintz, Drug Approval Hit, Wash. Post, July 21, 1987 (Health News), at
6; see also REPORT OF THE HUMAN RESOURCES AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS SUBCOMM., Gov-
ERNMENT OPERATIONS COMM., FDA's REGULATION OF THE NEw DRUG MERITAL, H.R. Doc. No. 206,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1987). In addition, the manufacturer withheld information from the
FDA about side effects, including thirty fatalities implicated in the drug's use. Id. at 80-81. The
drug was marketed for about six months in this country before the company voluntarily ended
sales worldwide.
124. Similar regulatory failures took place with regard to Oraflex, an arthritis drug connected
with kidney and liver damage, which was manufactured by Eli Lilly & Co.. The FDA approved the
drug in the first year of the Reagan Administration, when the FDA was boasting of its increased
approval of new drugs over past years. See Demkovich, Critics Fear the FDA is Going Too Far in
Cutting Industry's Regulatory Load, 1982 NAT'L J. 1249, 1250. The FDA approved twenty-seven
new chemical entities in 1981, compared to only twelve in 1980. The Agency had refused to ap-
prove Oraflex two years before. Id. The company failed to report overseas deaths associated with
use of the drug and eventually pleaded guilty to statutory violations. Id. Eli Lilly & Co. was fined
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ers. In addition, a recent study by the General Accounting Office dis-
covered that companies have underreported significantly the numbers
of injuries associated with the use of medical devices. 127
2. Industry Resources
Regulated industries, with so much at stake in the regulatory pro-
cess, are willing to commit enormous resources and "generate rather in-
tense activity aimed at influencing" 128 agency decisions. Industries often
are represented by trade associations, which lobby both the agencies
and the Congress.1 2" The Outdoor Power Equipment Institute (OPEI)
directed an example of powerful lobbying with respect to product safety
on behalf of industry. After the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC) issued its safety standard for power lawn mowers, the OPEI
successfully lobbied Congress to postpone the standard and amend it to
eliminate one of its key safety features.130
$25,000 and one medical officer was fined $15,000. Metzenbaum, Is Government Protecting Con-
sumers?, TRIAL, April 1986, at 23, 24; see also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
125. The FDA failed to act on the drug Zomax, a painkiller, despite receipt of reports of over
2,000 allergic reactions. Wash. Post, July 21, 1988 (Health News), at 6, col. 4. In hearings before
the House Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, the Subcommit-
tee learned that responsible agency officials were unaware of most of the reports. Hearings on
Zomax Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and Governmental Relations of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
126. Selacryn, a high blood pressure medication, is another example of an approved drug
with adverse side effects. Again, the manufacturer failed to inform the FDA of cases of liver dam-
age caused by the drug's use in France. It took the Justice Department three years after the FDA
recommended criminal charges to bring misdemeanor charges against the company and several of
its medical officers for failures to report adverse reactions. Nat'l L.J., July 2, 1984, at 3, col. 1. The
officials entered nolo contendere pleas and were sentenced to perform two hundred hours of com-
munity service. Metzenbaum, supra note 124, at 25. The FDA had recommended felony charges,
but Justice Department officials decided the case was not strong enough. Id.
127. Medical Devices: Early Warning of Problems Is Hampered by Severe Underreporting:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment, House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (testimony of the General Accounting Office). The Gen-
eral Accounting Office found that less than 1% of the problems with devices were ultimately re-
ceived by the FDA, and the type of problem reported was more likely not to involve an injury,
suggesting "a certain amount of selective reporting." Id. at 7. One unreported incident discovered
by the General Accounting Office study resulted in the death of a patient. Id.
128. P. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 13 (1981). The author
states that "[r]egulatory decisions.., often have major effects on the interests of regulated indus-
tries .... Industry perceives that its overall financial position can be significantly affected by
regulatory agency decisions, and it can therefore generate rather intense activity aimed at influenc-
ing them." Id.
129. D. BOLLIER & J. CLAYBROOK, supra note 114, at 206-07.
130. Pittle, Hill Panel Mows Down Safety Rule, Wash. Star, May 21, 1981, at A19, col. 1
(editorial comment by then CPSC Commissioner R. David Pittle) (stating that "without a hearing,
without a record, [and] without cost benefit analysis," Congress fundamentally altered the rule).
For a detailed discussion of the power lawn mower standard setting process, see Schwartz, The
Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Consumer Decade, 51 GEo.
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Concomitant to industry influence is the lack of consumer influ-
ence. Consumers have few formal organizations, such as trade associa-
tions or political action committees, to represent their interests in the
regulatory system.131 Organizing consumers is difficult because their
stake in the regulatory system seems small, even imperceptible. 3 2 Even
when agency procedures have provided for substantial consumer partic-
ipation in the rulemaking process, as under the original Consumer
Product Safety Act' consumer influence cannot approximate that of
an industry with interests at stake.134
Consumer organizations lack adequate resources to advance their
interests in the regulatory process. Participation in the adoption of reg-
ulatory standards is costly. 35 Consumer groups, "whose annual budgets
often equal the amount spent by one corporation for a sixty second tel-
evision advertisement,' ' ls cannot afford the same level of participation
as industry groups. While the agency can serve as a "counterweight" to
the industry's point of view,'3 7 the agency is often dependent on the
industry and is not fully able to fulfill this task.
WASH. L. REv. 32, 77-95 (1982). The controversial provision of the agency's standard, which the
industry opposed, required that the mower blades stop when the operator leaves the operating
position, and either that the engine not stop or that it have an easy power restart. In short, the
agency did not want to permit an engine shut-off with a manual restart that would prove inconve-
nient to users and encourage them to disable the system. Id. at 91. The lobbying effort produced
what the industry wanted and had urged throughout the standard setting process-permission to
adopt a mechanism that would shut off the engine to stop the blades. Id. at 94.
131. D. BOLLIER & J. CLAYBROOK, supra note 114, at 204-07.
132. P. QUmE, supra note 128, at 13 (stating that "[e]ven though in the aggregate the deci-
sion may be worth a great deal, each individual considers it a matter of minor or no importance
and directs his or her attention elsewhere"); see also D. BOLLIER & J. CLAYBROOK, supra note 114,
at 203; S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, supra note 1, at 23-24 (stating that "most people are unaware
that regulations play any role in their well-being").
133. See 15 U.S.C. § 2056(d)(2) (1982) (providing for an "offeror" process whereby groups
outside the agency, including consumer groups, could develop product safety standards). For a
description of the process and a study of one standard setting process conducted by Consumers
Union, see Schwartz, supra note 130.
134. A case study of CPSC's standard setting procedures found that consumer participants
were dependent largely on industry for the technical data. Over time the participation of consum-
ers in the lengthy rulemaking process diminished, while industry's participation "picked up as the
standard took form and more businesses became aware of its potential economic impact."
Schwartz, supra note 130, at 82.
135. The estimated costs to industry of two CPSC standards were over $1 million for the
lawn mower standard and $500,000 for the architectural glass standard. Id. at 64 n.225. The costs
to consumer groups are similarly steep. See 3 SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH
CONG., IST SESS., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN REGULATORY AGENCY
PROCEEDINGS, vii, 17-22 (1977).





The problem of obsolescence is more acute now than in the past. In
the past, the typical standards that courts might adopt, such as a traffic
ordinance or a railroad crossing rule, did not become outdated quickly.
In the modern, high-tech era, however, changes in technology and sci-
ence occur more rapidly and can cause product safety standards to be-
come outmoded quickly. For example, adverse side effects of drugs may
become known to manufacturers well before they become known to the
regulatory agency, and certainly well before the agency can act upon
them. l s
While agencies need to respond quickly to the hazards in the mar-
ketplace, the delays inherent in the regulatory process make such a re-
sponse difficult. Some agencies have taken decades to act on certain
products. The FDA's massive review of the effectiveness of prescription
drugs took twenty-two years, and might have taken longer if a lawsuit,
which spurred the agency to complete the job, had not been filed.13 9 In
the past eighteen years only two flammable fabric standards have been
issued to cover children's sleepwear; and the industry standard for gen-
eral wearing apparel, enacted into law thirty-five years ago to prevent
the return of "torch sweaters," remains on the books unchanged.1 0 In
aircraft regulation, seat-strength requirements established in the early
1950s have remained unchanged for over three decades despite enor-
mous changes in aircraft design and widespread agreement that the
standards are inadequate."4 ' Even under normal circumstances, regula-
tory decisions typically require several years at a minimum. 14
Limited resources also cause standards to become outdated. With
138. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
139. Molotsky, U.S. Review of Prescription Drugs Ends, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1984, at 52,
col. 1 (city ed.). The review of 3,443 prescription drugs led to the withdrawal of over 1000. An FDA
official heading the review charged that the delay was caused partly by drugmakers using delaying
tactics, such as challenging even clear findings of ineffectiveness so they could continue to sell their
drugs while the process went on. This charge was denied by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association. Id. at col. 2.
140. Hearings on H.R. 1115 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection, &
Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)
(statement of David Pittle, Technical Director, Consumers Union and former Commissioner,
CPSC).
141. Airline Safety, supra note 122, at 46. An FAA study in 1969 found the seat-strength
rules, written when the DC-3 was the standard carrier, were inadequate for 87% of airline acci-
dents. The Civil Aeronautics Board recommended stiffer requirements, but no action has been
taken. Id.
142. Hutt, Regulatory Reform Promise Has Not Been Fulfilled, Legal Times, May 17, 1982,
at 13, col. 1 (stating that FDA regulations take at least two years); Schwartz, supra note 130, at 62-
66 (stating that CPSC standards under the unique "offeror" process established by the Act took an
average of three years); Stanfield, Resolving Disputes, 1986 NAT'L J. 2764, 2765 (noting that EPA
rules take a minimum of three years).
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limited resources, agencies can address relatively few safety problems at
a time. As an agency pursues the most serious problems, many others
must go unattended. For example, when the National Highway Traffic
Safety Agency (NHTSA) devoted enormous resources to the passive re-
straint rule in the late 1970s, it could not revise at the same time other
motor vehicle standards that had become outdated. 143 While the FDA
reviewed prescription drug effectiveness, review of nonprescription
drugs had to be postponed.""' The FAA has focused its resources on
aircraft standards to reduce the risk of crashes, but it has been notori-
ously slow in dealing with crashworthiness standards that would reduce
injuries in the event of a crash.145 Indeed, the National Transportation
Safety Board has concluded that crashworthiness regulations have
failed to reflect findings from FAA and industry studies over the last
three decades.146
Although agency priorities may be sound from a regulatory stand-
point, they demonstrate that regulatory standards do not function well
as standards of liability under the tort system. One jurist has suggested
that courts could take into account an agency's priorities in deciding
what weight to assign compliance with its regulations.1 47 With respect
to FAA standards, for example, courts could give greater deference to
those regulations that are central to airworthiness, such as engine de-
sign, and less deference to those that deal with crashworthiness, such as
seat belts and exits.14 1 This suggestion, however, has two drawbacks. It
would create uncertainties about the effect to be given regulatory com-
pliance, and courts would have to inquire into agency priorities far
afield of the issues typically at stake in tort litigation.
C. The Regulatory System Under the Reagan Administration
The problems of industry influence and obsolescence, which are in-
herent in the regulatory system, have been exacerbated greatly during
143. Interview with Joan Claybrook, former Administrator, NHTSA (Jan. 30, 1988); see also
Ditlow Testimony, supra note 47 (criticizing the lack of standard setting by NHTSA during the
Reagan years).
144. Molotsky, supra note 139 (stating that both consumer advocates and FDA officials con-
sidered prescription drugs to be the top priority for review).
145. See Airline Safety, supra note 122, at 30. The emphasis at the FAA and among manu-
facturers has been on avoiding crashes-"The primary thing is not to crash in the first place." Id.
146. Dillingham, Crashworthiness FARs and the Effect of Compliance in Products Liability
Actions Involving Airplanes, 33 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 55, 64 (1982).
147. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 85, 577 P.2d 1322, 1335 (1978) (en banc)
(Linde, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 85-86, 577 P.2d at 1335 (Linde, J., concurring). Justice Linde speculated that the
defendant would be able to show that the FAA's standard for engines resulted from the same
judgment as would be made under tort law, but that the FAA's standards for exits, instrument
knobs, and seat belts might very well not result from the same judgments. Id.
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the Reagan Administration. Industry influence has never been greater,
nor consumer input less, than during the 1980s. Furthermore, the Rea-
gan Administration's generally antiregulatory approach to product
safety and its cutbacks in agency resources have heightened the risk
that existing standards will become outdated.
1. Industry Influence
From the outset, the Reagan Administration promoted a "regula-
tory relief' agenda and signalled "an intent to regulate less-not neces-
sarily better.' 4 9 Personnel appointments reflected the Administration's
business orientation1 50 and the politicization of the regulatory pro-
cess.lbl Industry was given a greater role in the regulatory process at the
expense of consumer interests.1 52
Upon assuming office, President Reagan issued Executive Order
12,291, which consolidated oversight of executive agency rulemaking in
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and established a cost-
benefit test for all major executive agency rules.153 Implementation of
149. Costle, supra note 1, at 409.
150. See S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, supra note 1, at 85-109:
While President Carter selected those who believed in regulation and looked for ways to ex-
pand the impact of regulations, President Reagan appointed critics of the regulatory process
who had been fighting government regulations long before they arrived in Washington. The
Reagan appointees echoed their boss' view that most regulation was burdensome, inflationary,
and unneeded.
Id. at 85.
151. For example, the CPSC had become so heavily staffed with noncareer, political positions
that Congress, in its appropriations measure for fiscal year 1988, reduced the number of such posi-
tions. It was felt that these appointees were contributing to the turmoil in the agencies and inter-
fering with the agency's safety mission. See 16 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 4 (1988); H. J.
Res. 395, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H. REP. No. 498, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
152. See infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
153. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 431-43
(1982). While Executive Order No. 12,291 gave the OMB greater control over agency rulemaking
than it had possessed in the past, each president since Nixon has increased the OMB's control over
the process. See Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write
Regulation, 99 H~nv. L. Rxv. 1059, 1061-62 (1986). The Order requires executive agencies to pre-
pare a "Regulatory Impact Analysis" detailing the costs and benefits of proposed and final "major"
rules. Executive Order No. 12,291, § 3(c)(2), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 432. Major rules
are those with an effect on the economy of $100 million or more, or a significant adverse effect on
prices, competition, employment, and productivity. No rule is to be undertaken "unless the poten-
tial benefits to society ... outweigh the potential costs." Id. § 2(d), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
app. at 432. In choosing among alternatives, agencies must choose "the alternative involving the
least net costs to society." Id. Further, the OMB reviews proposed rules before they are published
for comment, and after comment and decision by the agency, the OMB again reviews the final rule
and may delay its issuance until the agency has responded to the OMB's views. Id. § 3(f)(1)-(2),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 432. A Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief may target
existing regulations for review.
In 1985 President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,498, which further expands the OMB's
control over agency rulemaking by giving the OMB authority to review agencies' early plans to
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this Executive Order has been criticized widely15 for increasing indus-
try influence on the regulatory process. The application of a cost-bene-
fit analysis under the order also has favored greatly industry interests.
a. "Back Door" Influence
The Executive Order has been characterized as a "back door, un-
published, channel of access to the highest levels of political authority
in the Administration for industry alone.' 55 At the outset of the Ad-
ministration, businessmen were encouraged to seek assistance from the
OMB or the White House if they could not get satisfaction from the
agencies in seeking regulatory relief.156 Meetings with industry repre-
sentatives occurred often; similar meetings with consumer groups were
rare.
157
Industry influence on the OMB has resulted in the revision, delay,
or disappearance of proposed rules.'58 For example, aspirin manufactur-
ers sought to avoid the FDA's proposed rule requiring that labels on
aspirin products warn of the risks of Reye's Syndrome, a serious illness
associated with the use of that product. In 1982 the FDA had proposed
the warning on the basis of a number of scientific studies, as well as
reports by the Center for Disease Control and the American Academy
undertake rulemaking and to determine whether they may proceed. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3
C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 40-41 (Supp. II 1984). Agencies must provide
such a detailed justification for proceeding with rulemaking that the development of any basis
upon which to proceed is discouraged. Morrison, supra, at 1063. This OMB approval process pre-
cludes agencies from requesting data or undertaking any research until they have the OMB's per-
mission to do so, which "den[ies] agencies the benefit of public input on a potential problem at
precisely the time when it may be most helpful." Id. at 1068.
154. See HousE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, OMB INTERFERENCE WITH OSHA
RULEMAKING, H.R. REP. No. 583, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter HR. REP. No. 583]; S.
TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, supra note 1, at 59-60; Costle, supra note 1; Morrison, supra note 153, at
1071 (arguing that Congress should eliminate the OMB's involvement in agency rulemaking).
155. H. RE. No. 583, supra note 154, at 11. As one industry member honestly assessed the
advantages of their access to the OMB: "Whenever we disagree with the FDA, it's nice to have
another shot at it-not only at HHS but also at OMB." Kosterlitz, Reagan is Leaving His Mark
on the Food and Drug Administration, 17 NAT'L J. 1568, 1571 (1985) (statement of John T.
Walden, senior vice president of the Proprietary Association and former associate FDA
commissioner).
156. S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, supra note 1, at 59-60 (quoting Vice President Bush's assis-
tant, C. Boyden Gray, in a speech to the Chamber of Commerce on April 10, 1981).
157. See H. REP. No. 583, supra note 154, at 11 (documenting instances in which the OMB
met with industry representatives but ignored requests for similar meetings with union
representatives).
158. With respect to the FDA, the OMB's influence resulted in the staying of a proposal by
the FDA to ban certain dyes found by scientists to cause cancer in laboratory animals, the delaying
and changing of quality control standards for makers of infant formula, and the holding up of
implementation of reporting requirements for medical device makers. Kosterlitz, supra note 155,
at 1568-70.
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of Pediatrics.15 After pressure from industry members, however, OMB
officials asked the FDA to withdraw the proposal for further scientific
study. 60 Even after further scientific proof was developed, the FDA
proved to be a reluctant regulator."6" Despite strong evidence of an as-
sociation between Reye's Syndrome and aspirin use, acknowledged by
the FDA Commissioner, the FDA delayed rulemaking, seeking more ev-
idence that would "unequivocally establish" the link.6 2 The Agency ini-
tiated public service announcements about the risk and encouraged
voluntary labeling, but was reluctant to mandate a warning.' Finally,
however, a regulation was issued.16 4 Unlike the tort system, though, the
FDA had required that the risk be "unequivocally established.' 1 65
b. Secrecy
The full extent of industry influence on the OMB cannot be gauged
because most of it occurs behind closed doors. In a study of the OMB's
early implementation of Executive Order 12,291, the General Account-
ing Office was sharply critical of the OMB's secret proceedings and its
failure to document its views and communications with the agencies.'66
159. See Novick, Use of Epidemiological Studies to Prove Legal Causation: Aspirin and
Reye's Syndrome, A Case in Point, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 536, 544-45 (1987).
160. Id. at 545. In September 1982 the Secretary of the Health and Human Services Depart-
ment (of which the FDA is a component) signed the proposed regulation; in October, the Health
and Human Services Department delayed publication pending OMB review; and in November
"under intense pressure from the drug industry," the Health and Human Services Department
withdrew the regulation and announced another study of the link between aspirin and Reye's Syn-
drome. Id.
161. Emergency Reye's Syndrome Prevention Act of 1985: Hearings on H.R. 1381 Before the
Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th
Cong., 1st Seas. (1985).
162. Id. at 345.
163. Id. at 334-35 (testimony of FDA Commissioner Frank E. Young detailing the agency's
extensive education efforts and the voluntary labeling program).
164. 21 C.F.R. § 201 (1986). The mandatory warning went into effect on June 5, 1986.
165. See, e.g., Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970) (a warning
should have been given when a scientific study showed a "correlation" between the drug and blind-
ness, even though the cause and effect relationship was not definitively established at the time).
166. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVED QuALrrY, ADEQUATE RESOURCES, AND CONSISTENT
OVERSIGHT NEEDED IF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IS TO HELP CONTROL COSTS OF REGULATIONS 53-54
(1982). The General Accounting Office reported:
The result of [the OMB's] non-documented approach to rulemaking is that the public cannot
determine at whose initiative a rule was issued. While the agency formally remains accounta-
ble for its rules, the record does not show whether the agency made its decisions primarily on
the basis of its interpretation of the evidence available to it or in response to OMB directives.
Because OMB's influence is potentially great, its apparent openness to ex parte commu-
nications ... about pending rules raises similar disclosure concerns.. . . The public cannot
determine either who made the regulatory decision, or on what basis it was made.
Id.
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Consumer representatives,'1 7 legislators,'6 8 and academics also have
criticized the secret proceedings.6 9 Decisionmaking becomes highly sus-
pect 7 0 and meaningful judicial review of agency decisions is under-
mined by such secrecy.17 ' If the proposed reforms giving regulatory
standards greater weight in tort determinations were adopted, this se-
crecy would hinder greatly a plaintiff's efforts to challenge the adequacy
of these standards.
c. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Many commentators acknowledge that cost-benefit analysis may be
a useful tool for making regulatory decisions, but they also recognize
inherent weaknesses in applying cost-benefit analysis to health and
safety regulations. 72 The problem is that the cost-benefit analysis inev-
itably favors industry over consumer interests and regulation7 because
benefits to consumers tend to be undervalued'74 while costs to industry
tend to be overstated.17 5
Under Executive Order 12,241, the inherent bias against regulation
in the cost-benefit approach has been increased. Critics argue that the
OMB purposefully has used cost-benefit analysis to reach results that
167. Regulatory Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 2327 Before the Subcomm. on Administra-
tive Law and Government Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
107-08 (1983) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2327] (testimony of Joan Claybrook, President, Public
Citizen); see also Morrison, supra note 153, at 1064 (Morrison is Director of the Public Citizen
Litigation Group).
168. H.R. REP. No. 583, supra note 154, at 12-13.
169. See McGarity, Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 Tax. L. REV. 1243, 1309
(1987).
170. See Morrison, supra note 153, at 1064 (stating that "the entire process operates in an
atmosphere of secrecy and insulation from public debate that makes a mockery of the system of
open participation embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act").
171. See id. at 1072 (arguing that OMB's oral and written communications to agencies
should be put on the record to assure adequate judicial review).
172. See S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, supra note 1, at 141 (stating that "[a]lthough cost-bene-
fit analysis can be useful in determining the most cost-effective alternative among competing regu-
latory devices, it should be laid to rest as a dominant policy tool-as inadequate, inequitable, and
subject to excessive political distortion in its application"). But see D. BOLLIER & J. CLAYBROOK,
supra note 114, at 202 (arguing that cost-benefit analysis may be appropriate in "financial invest-
ment decisionmaking," but not in health and safety regulation).
173. See, e.g., Clark, Do the Benefits Justify the Costs? Prove It, Says the Administration,
1981 NAT'L J. 1382.
174. This is especially true when the benefits do not become manifest immediately upon
implementation of a rule, but occur in the future after the rule has had time to take effect. See S.
TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, supra note 1, at 126-28; see also McGarity, supra note 169, at 1283.
175. Costle, supra note 1, at 415. The costs of regulation are felt almost immediately and are
more easily assessed by business. Often the cost estimates are supplied by industry and are in-
flated. Id. at 415 n.20 (citing examples in which both industry and government have overestimated
the costs of regulation in the environmental area).
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favor the interests of industry.1 7 6 This goal has been evidenced by the
uneven manner in which the cost-benefit analysis has been applied; reg-
ulations that further the Administration's political agenda, for example,
often have been exempt from cost-benefit analysis. 7 Critics also charge
that the benefits of regulation are grossly undervalued by the OMB.
The OMB has urged agencies to calculate indirect costs of regulation,
but not indirect benefits. One critic has pointed out, however, that "[i]t
is our collective thinking about regulation's indirect benefits that needs
stimulation, not the other way around."1 8 With respect to health and
environmental regulations that create benefits for future generations,
the OMB has insisted on discounting the future benefits to their pre-
sent value, using a high discount rate that renders their present value
very low and "likely to be outweighed by even modest costs.' 79 The
discrepancy between this regulatory approach to long-term risks and
benefits and the tort system's approach is substantial.
d. Budget Cutbacks
Reductions in agency budgets may lead to even greater deference
to industry groups in the future and to an inability to keep regulatory
standards up-to-date. 180 The cutbacks at some agencies, such as the
CPSC's ' and the FDA,82 have been substantial and have led to signifi-
176. See id. at 417. Mr. Costle concludes that under Executive Order No. 12,291, "cost-bene-
fit analysis has decidedly shifted from using cost-benefit concepts as an analytical tool to make
regulation better to requiring cost-benefit analysis to justify a particular regulation, and thus to
regulate less." Id. (emphasis in original).
177. See McGarity, supra note 169, at 1315-17. The OMB regularly waives cost-benefit anal-
yses for rules that provide regulatory relief, which demonstrates the bias of the process in favor of
industry interests. Clearly such rules can be detrimental to human health and safety and if cost-
benefit analysis is a neutral analysis it should be applied evenhandedly to both regulatory and
deregulatory proposals. Id.
178. Costle, supra note 1, at 420 (emphasis in original).
179. McGarity, supra note 169, at 1296. As Professor McGarity points out, the OMB's use of
a 10% discount rate means that "a dollar's worth of benefits 50 years from now is worth slightly
less than a penny today." Id. at 1296 n.293.
180. Cutbacks at the CPSC will mean less Agency participation in and monitoring of the
voluntary standards process because travel expenses will be among the first items to be cut. 16
Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 104 (1988). The Agency already relies heavily on industries to
develop voluntary standards; less Agency monitoring translates into even greater reliance on indus-
tries to regulate themselves.
181. The CPSC's appropriation for 1988 was approximately $32.7 million, a reduction of $1.5
million made at the Commission's request, necessitating a reduction in senior staff and operating
costs across the board. 16 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 4 (1988). The 1989 budget mark of
$32.9 million set by the OMB will require further reductions in funding for a number of projects,
including ATVs, the bicycle and riding mower projects, and data collection. 16 Prod. Safety &
Liab. Rep. (BNA) 75 (1988).
182. Between 1980 and 1986, FDA lost nearly 1,000 employees, or 12% of its workforce. The
staff fell from about 8,000 in 1980 to about 7,000 in 1986. Kosterlitz, supra note 155, at 1571.
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cant reductions in the workforce and the range of product safety initia-
tives. Some of the most experienced employees have left the FDA.1,
Lower budgets also mean fewer safety inspections,""' less regulation,
and less timely regulations. At the CPSC, for example, the agency's
data collection system is half the size that it was when the agency was
created in 1972,85 and therefore, it takes twice as long to collect infor-
mation on product-related injuries and to determine whether regulatory
action is warranted.186 Thus, projects designed to update standards are
expected to take four years to complete.18 7
e. Regulatory Inaction
One result of both the bias toward industry and the budgetary cut-
backs has been a reduction in the creation and enforcement of stan-
dards by the agencies responsible for consumer product safety. Delays
and inaction similar to those in FDA rulemaking have occurred in other
product safety agencies.1 8 The NHTSA, for example, issued only one
safety standard that was not compelled by a court order in the first four
years of the Reagan Administration. s9 The Agency focused "nearly ex-
clusively on modifying driver behavior" and "largely ignored the critical
technological mandate" granted by statute to set product safety stan-
dards.1 90 Critics charge that the NHTSA has failed to address a range
of issues that would save thousands of lives.' For example, it has
183. Among those leaving were some of its most experienced scientists. Id. Concern also has
been expressed about the replacement of those leaving at the higher levels with appointments that
are based more on political background than scientific expertise. See id. at 1571-72.
184. For example, due to the deregulation of the trucking industry, the number of interstate
trucking companies has jumped from 18,000 to over 30,000, and the number of independent truck-
ers has grown to over 200,000. At the same time, the number of safety inspections has been re-
duced because of a combination of budget cutbacks and the prevailing view of a limited role for
government. Corrigan, Squeeze on Safety, 1987 NAT'L J. 356, 361.
185. 16 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 91 (1988).
186. Id. The data are needed to support both voluntary and mandatory standards, according
to Carl Blechschmidt, CPSC program manager, because industries generally are not convinced that
action is needed unless data demonstrate that there is a problem. Id.
187. Id. at 91-92. One project studying bicycles is aimed at updating a ten year-old standard
that the staff believes may be outdated because of new equipment that has come on the market in
the interim. Nearly one-half million bicycle injuries occur each year to children and adults. Id. at
92.
188. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (regarding OMB's interference in FDA
rulemaking).
189. NHTSA Authorization and Oversight: Hearings on H.R. 2248 Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1985) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2248] (statement of Rep.
Wirth, Chairman of the Subcommittee).
190. Id.
191. The Agency should pursue standards for "side impact protection, pedestrian safety,
light truck and van automatic crash protection, and heavy vehicle braking [which] could save
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failed to make a number of its standards applicable to light pickup
trucks and minivans, despite evidence showing that the market share of
such multipurpose vehicles has nearly doubled in recent years and that
families are using them as passenger vehicles. 1 2 In 1987 the Senate,
frustrated by the delays and inaction, sought to put pressure on the
NHTSA by passing legislation that directs it to expedite certain
rulemaking proceedings and research projects. 93
The CPSC, an agency racked by dissension and turmoil,1 4 also has
virtually abandoned setting mandatory standards. It relies on voluntary
standards, developed by industry with some Agency staff input, as the
primary means for implementing the safety goals of its statute. The vol-
untary process often has led to unsatisfactory results. 9 5 As a result of
the CPSC's refusal to act, Congress has attempted to pressure it into
regulating a number of products that have become hazardous to the
public.9 '
thousands of additional lives each year." Id. at 91 (statement of Joan Claybrook, President, Public
Citizen and former Administrator of the NHTSA). The Agency has either rescinded advance no-
tices of these rules or taken no action. See id. at 96-98.
192. 15 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 49 (1987) (stating that the market share went from
15% in 1971 to 29% in 1985). NHTSA exempted minivans and light pickup trucks from safety
standards because they constituted a very small part of the market, but they are now a larger
segment and more fatalities are occurring in these vehicles-an increase of 15.8% from 1984 to
1985. Corrigan, supra note 184, at 359-60. Although the Carter Administration took initial steps to
end the exemption for these vehicles, the Reagan Administration did not pursue the issue. Id. at
360. More study was needed, but the Agency was slow to undertake it. Id. In 1987 the NHTSA
issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking on possible changes in vehicle classification that
would strengthen standards for light trucks and vans. 15 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 773,
801 (1987). The agency projects a proposed rule in 1988. Id. at 105. A final standard, no doubt, will
take several years.
193. S. 853, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), noted in 16 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 103
(1988). The statute directs the Agency to act on extending certain passenger car standards to
minivans and light trucks, strengthening side impact protection, requiring lap-shoulder belts in
rear seats, and contracting for crashworthiness research. The Agency has indicated that some of
these items are included in its rulemaking priorities for 1988. 16 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA)
105 (1988). The conference report on appropriations for the Agency directs the NHTSA to move
swiftly in these areas in fiscal year 1988 and allocates certain sums for these purposes. H.R. REP.
No. 498, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
194. See Outlook for Product Safety & Liability in 1987, 15 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep.
(BNA) 47 (1987) (describing the dissension among commissioners that has disrupted Agency deci-
sionmaking and delayed recent proposals to restructure the Agency in order to make it more effec-
tive in protecting consumers).
195. In 1985, for example, the CPSC turned to the all-terrain vehicle (ATV) industry to de-
velop a voluntary standard for its vehicles, but two and one-half years later the CPSC Chairman
reported that the industry was still "dragging its feet with respect to ATV safety," and had not
met to discuss the issue in several months. Id. at 815.
196. Senate and House committees have been especially critical of the Agency's failure to
address a number of dangerous products. Recent reauthorization bills in both chambers have di-
rected the Agency to address specific products such as lawn darts, cigarette lighters, all-terrain
vehicles, adult sleepwear flammability, and choking hazards in small toy parts. Id. at 102-03.
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Ironically, under the proposed tort reform the widespread failure to
regulate could prove beneficial to plaintiffs, for it would reduce the
availability of the strengthened regulatory compliance defense. On the
other hand, if the reforms are implemented, industry may seek more
regulation.
D. Broad Ramifications on Regulatory and Tort Systems
The above discussion of the modern regulatory process and the de-
velopments in the Reagan Administration suggests that the effects of
the proposed tort reforms on both the regulatory and tort systems could
be profound. Business groups may increase their efforts to influence the
regulatory process and assure minimum standards. The tort system
may become vulnerable to shifts in federal policies, with the tort system
weakening when the federal regulatory system is weak, which could re-
duce significantly incentives for product safety.
1. Impact on the Regulatory Process
One consequence of the proposed reforms could be to encourage
product sellers to "sit back" and not take safety measures that would
exceed regulatory requirements.197 Another effect might be to encourage
industry to resist updating existing standards and even to seek more
rules that could protect them from civil liability. Industries generally
seek regulations that are in their business interests,198 and they often
are successful. With protection from civil liability at stake in the regula-
tory process, business groups most likely will devote even more effort to
influencing the regulatory process.
The proposed reforms also may increase the demands on the regu-
latory process itself. Currently, regulators do not factor into their delib-
erations the effects of their standards on products liability litigation.19" '
Indeed, the courts have given no indication that regulations will define
the levels of safety required by the tort system. The proposed reforms,
however, would change the role of regulations in the tort system; thus,
agencies would have to factor this broader effect into their rulemaking.
Agencies also would have to consider whether a particular rule would
further the safety mandates of the statutes if used by the courts to
197. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
198. See Schwartz, supra note 130, at 55 n.153 (noting that most agency petitioners re-
present business interests).
199. Interview with Linda Horton, Deputy Chief Counsel for Regulations and Hearings,
FDA, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 23, 1988). According to Ms. Horton, the effects on tort liability
are "not routinely part of the deliberative process before a rule is proposed." The Agency may
address the issue if it is raised during the comment period, but in that case, it takes a neutral point
of view. Id.
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shield manufacturers from liability.
The rulemaking process would become more complex and costly if
the reforms were adopted. All interested parties, concerned about the
impact of these reforms, would provide data to the agencies on the sub-
ject and anxiously await the agencies' explanations of agency standards,
so that their relevance to tort claims could be determined easily.200 For
example, potential defendants might want agencies to consider and re-
ject certain matters in order to lay a basis for the compliance defense in
future tort actions.
2. Interaction Between Tort and Regulatory Systems
The interaction of the products liability and regulatory systems en-
hances overall product safety. As noted earlier, judicial treatment of
regulatory violations as negligence per se creates incentives for regula-
tory compliance. 20 ' The two systems also interact in other ways. The
tort system can provide an incentive, perhaps the key incentive, for
manufacturers to recall their dangerous products.202 The tort system
also spurs government to act upon discovery of the otherwise undetect-
able risks associated with products. The risks associated with asbestos
and with the Dalkon Shield are two good examples of risks that first
became known through the tort system and later were regulated by the
government.20 3 A more recent example is burn injuries to children from
200. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text (concerning the difficulty of applying reg-
ulatory standards to issues in -litigation).
201. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
202. There is a potential for punitive damages for failing to recall a product. See, e.g., Lewy
v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1107 (8th Cir. 1988) (pointing to the fact that defendant's
product safety subcommittee decided not to recall a rifle after evaluating consumer complaints; the
court determined that the defendant acted with "conscious disregard for the safety of others,"
which warranted imposition of punitive damages under Missouri law); see also Schwartz & Adler,
Product Recalls: A Remedy in Need of Repair, 34 CASE W. Rs. L. Rav. 401, 416, 440, 458 (1984).
The authors of that article studied the recall programs of the NHTSA, the FDA, and the CPSC
and found that concerns about products liability suits and adverse publicity encourage manufac-
turers to recall their products voluntarily. They also found that, in the case of automobile recalls,
these same concerns could discourage voluntary recalls if the manufacturer thought that the pub-
licity actually might increase lawsuits by informing consumers who had had accidents with the
recalled cars that they might have a claim. Id. at 417.
Because enforcement actions are costly and time consuming, the government must rely on
voluntary compliance to a very great extent in recall cases. Id. at 415-16, 438-39, 456-57. Indeed, a
recall must be prompt to be effective, which makes voluntary compliance essential to effective
enforcement of the statute. If automobile recalls are not carried out quickly, for example, the vehi-
cle owners are more difficult to locate. Id. at 422. With respect to other consumer products, the age
of the recalled product also affects the response rate of consumers. Id. at 441-42. In the food and
drug area, of course, the recall must occur promptly before the products are consumed.
203. See D. HENSLER, W. FELSTINER, M. SELvIN & P. EBENER, ASBESTOS IN THE CouRTs: THE
CHALLENGE OF MASS Toxic TORTS, at iii, xxv-xxvi, 10-12 (1985) [hereinafter ASBESTOS IN THE
CouRTs]; M. MINTZ, AT ANY CosT, CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985).
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cigarette lighters.""4
Finally, the tort system also can be the stimulus for consumer
safety legislation in Congress. A recent example is the Childhood Vac-
cine Injury Compensation Act, which affords compensation for victims
of vaccine-related injuries. 05 The numerous products liability claims re-
sulting from vaccines spurred manufacturers and the Congress to find a
solution to the problem.0 6 If compliance with FDA regulations had
been a strong defense in these suits, as the proposed reforms would al-
low, no remedy would have existed for the victims of vaccine injuries.
Under the proposed reforms, the tort system would be weakened
by the increased deference to federal standards and no longer would
serve as a robust spur to federal safety enforcement. During the Reagan
Administration, the role of the tort system has been especially impor-
tant because of the government's reluctance to take strong enforcement
actions. 07 The Administration has relied extensively on voluntary in-
204. For example, the CPSC, after some forty products liability suits were filed and Congres-
sional pressure was put on the Agency, initiated a rule to make cigarette lighters child resistant.
Walsh, Consumer Safety Panel to Seek Childproof Cigarette Lighters, Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 1988,
at F2, col. 5. In announcing its action, the CPSC said that in a single year, 1985, children playing
with lighters had caused 120 deaths, 860 injuries, and $60.5 million in property damages. Id. In the
case of ATVs, the CPSC did not act to force the recall of the vehicles until 1988, despite statistics
showing nearly 800 deaths and more than 300,000 injuries relating to their use since 1982. Blum,
ATV Attack: State and Federal Legislation, Legal Action May Come Soon, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 7,
1987, at 8, col. 1; McAllister, Lawsuit Seeks to Win Refunds for ATV Buyers, Wash. Post, Jan. 14,
1988, at A4, col. 1.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11 (Supp. 1988), provides a no-fault compensation system for vaccine-
related injuries that provides for full recovery of economic damages and a cap of $250,000 for pain
and suffering. Plaintiff may pursue a fault-based tort claim, but warnings in compliance with FDA
regulations will be presumed adequate.
206. See generally H.R. REP. No. 908, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
207. A recent example was the failure of the government to require the recall of ATVs, which
have been linked to nearly 800 deaths and 300,000 injuries since 1982. Nat'l L.J., Jan. 18, 1988, at
9, col. 1. One year after the CPSC asked the Justice Department to bring suit seeking a recall, the
government accepted a consent decree that requires neither a recall nor a refund, but only warn-
ings about the hazards associated with the use of ATVs and training on their proper use. See 16
Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 60 (1988) (for the text of the complaint and the preliminary
consent decree). The consent agreement, which has been criticized widely as inadequate, was ac-
cepted by the CPSC, in part because the Justice Department planned to charge the Commission
an estimated $9 million ($3 million a year for three years) if it insisted on pursuing the claim for a
recall and refund. Id. at 4 (according to Congressman Doug Barnard (D-Ga), chairman of the
House Government Operations Committee's Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcom-
mittee, the Justice Department does not charge other government agencies for representing them
in court). For a small agency like the CPSC, with a budget of roughly $33 million, it would be an
intolerable drain on their resources.
In general, enforcement actions, such as recalls, fell off during the Reagan Administration.
With respect to the FDA, for example, in 1984 the number of cases brought represented a 52%
drop in the average brought each year during the previous administration. Kosterlitz, supra note
155, at 1569. The FDA brought 260 actions in 1984, compared to an average of 542 actions between
1977 and 1980. Critics concluded that the drop reflected the willingness of the Agency to allow
industry to mend its ways voluntarily, without an enforcement action. Id.
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dustry compliance, which only can be successful when a real threat of
agency enforcement or tort liability exists. Given the Administration's
reluctance to take enforcement actions, due either to lack of will or lack
of resources, the tort system remains the key incentive for product
safety.
The extent to which the federal government protects consumers,
through both standard setting and enforcement actions, bears directly
on the question of how strong the tort system should be. If the govern-
ment is a poor watchdog over consumer safety, as it has been through-
out the Reagan Administration, the strength of the tort system becomes
crucial.
The experience of the Reagan Administration also serves as a
warning that federal regulatory policies can shift dramatically, and that
under the proposed reforms the tort system would be more vulnerable
to those shifts. Under the proposed reforms, if the federal regulatory
system became weaker, the tort system would also become weaker, at
the very time when a robust tort system would be most needed.
IV. CONSIDERING THE PROPOSED REFORMS IN LIGHT OF THE PRODUCTS
LIABILITY CRISIS
Despite the weaknesses of the proposed reforms, they might be jus-
tified as a way to limit tort liability; if, as critics of the tort system
In the area of auto recalls, critics charge that the NHTSA has proceeded at a "snail's pace" in
investigating defects. Hearings on H.R. 2248, supra note 189, at 29 (remarks of Rep. Wirth). Fur-
ther, there has been a sharp drop in the number of recalls since the beginning of the Reagan
Administration. In the decade prior to 1981, the average number of auto recalls per year was 295.
Id. at 109 (testimony of Clarence M. Ditlow III, Director, Center for Auto Safety). During the first
four years of the Reagan Administration, the recalls numbered 196, 175, 182, and 209 respectively.
Id. Further, there was an 80% cut in public investigations and fifteen instances in which the
NHTSA asked for voluntary recalls, but the manufacturer refused and the NHTSA did not pur-
sue. Id. One of the Agency's most publicized failures to recall involves the Ford Motor Company,
which marketed millions of vehicles with automatic transmissions that occasionally slip out of park
into reverse and which have claimed over 200 lives. Id. For a discussion of the Ford transmission
case, see Schwartz & Adler, supra note 202, at 418-20 (noting that Ford did agree to send vehicle
owners a warning about the defect to affix to their dashboards, but refused to recall the vehicles in
order to correct the defect). Despite continuing injuries and deaths caused by the de-
fect-indicating the ineffectiveness of the dashboard stickers-as well as prodding by the Center
for Auto Safety, the NHTSA has refused to reopen the case.
The NHTSA also has been criticized by the President of the Insurance Institute for Highway
Safety for not requiring a mandatory recall of the Audi 5000, which was subject to sudden acceler-
ation problems. Corrigan, supra note 184, at 360. In 1987 the Center for Auto Safety reported that
over the previous eight years, the NHTSA had made requests-which went unheeded by manufac-
turers-for the recall of one out of every five cars sold. Id.
At the CPSC, the smallest of the product safety agencies, the number of recalls also has fallen
drastically during the Reagan Administration. Schwartz & Adler, supra note 202, at 426. The num-
ber of products recalled went from an average of 34.5 mllion in the previous administration to an
average of 2.5 million in the first years of the Reagan Administration. Id.
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contend, it is wildly out of control.208 The tort system, however, is not
in such dire straits, and its greatest weakness, the high transaction costs
of the litigation system, would not even be addressed by the proposed
reforms.
A. The Insurance "Crisis"
The major impetus for much of the reform movement has been the
so-called insurance "crisis." During the years 1984-1986, insurance rates
rose sharply. Insurance and industry groups portrayed tort and prod-
ucts liability litigation as the culprit. 09 The insurance industry under-
took a 6.5 million dollar advertising campaign to convince the public
that the "lawsuit crisis" had caused the difficulties in insurance availa-
bility and affordability. 210 The Attorney General's Tort Policy Working
Group issued a report tying the insurance crisis to the "veritable explo-
sion of tort liability in the United States. '211
As the issue was studied more carefully, however, it became less
clear that an insurance crisis existed at all,212 and the connection be-
tween insurance rates and the tort system became increasingly tenuous.
A study by the General Accounting Office found that the profitability of
the insurance industry is related to its cyclical nature and pricing poli-
cies. 213 In the early 1980s, insurance companies charged lower premiums
for insurance in order to obtain funds for investment at then prevailing
high interest rates.2  As long as interest rates remained high, the return
on investments offset underwriting losses and the industry remained
208. See generally ATrORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2.
209. See, e.g., Wermeil, Courting Disaster: The Costs of Lawsuits, Growing Ever Larger,
Disrupts the Economy, Wall St. J., May 16, 1986, at 1, col. 6; Taylor, Product Liability: The New
Morass, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1985, at F1, col. 2. But see Olender, The Great Insurance Fraud of
the '80's, Nat'l L.J., July 21, 1986, at 15, col. 1; Hunter, The Insurance Industry is to Blame,
Wash. Post, April 13, 1986, at C7, col. 2.
210. The Manufactured Crisis, 51 CONSUMER REP. 544, 545 (1986).
211. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. See generally id. at 16-59 (acknowl-
edging that the industry's pricing practices and general economic conditions have played a role in
the insurance crisis; the Report, nevertheless, finds that the tort law has played the central role in
the crisis).
212. See generally N. WEBER, PRODUCT LIABLrrY: THE CORPORATE RESPONSE 21 (1987) (con-
cluding that "[a]t least for major corporations, the so-called twin crisis of liability and insurance
have had relatively little impact"); Kindregan & Swartz, The Assault on the Captive Consumer:
Emasculating the Common Law of Torts in the Name of Reform, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 673, 710-11
(1987) (describing the growth in assets and income of the insurance industry in 1984-86).
213. The Liability Insurance Crisis: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabiliza-
tion of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 89-90
(1986) [hereinafter Insurance Crisis Hearings] (statement of William Anderson, Director, General
Government Division, General Accounting Office).
214. In the early 1980s interest rates went as high as 20%, which allowed insurance compa-
nies to slash the price of premiums. The Manufactured Crisis, supra note 210, at 544.
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profitable.Y In 1984, however, when interest rates fell, investment in-
come fell, and the industry suffered a loss."'6 By 1986 the prospects for
the industry again looked good. 17 By 1987 the insurance crisis almost
had disappeared as a basis for reforming tort and products liability
laws.218
That factors other than tort litigation played a major role in
skyrocketing insurance rates became even clearer when the insurance
"crisis" waned and the income and profits of the insurance industry
began to climb, without any marked change in products liability law to
account for the reverse in fortune.219 Interestingly, a similar insurance
"crisis" occurred during the mid-1970s, generating a push for federal
products liability reform, which stalled when "in the midst of this legis-
lative activity ... [p]roduct-liability insurance premiums came down
and the '[c]risis' eased. '2 20
B. Increases in Products Liability Claims
Another basis for products liability reform is the alleged increase in
the number of products liability claims being filed. The Attorney Gen-
eral's Tort Policy Working Group pointed to an astounding 758 percent
increase in the number of products liability claims filed in federal court
between 1974 and 1985.221 The Report speculated that state courts had
experienced a similar increase in claims.222 The federal claims, however,
which account for only two percent of all claims filed nationwide,22 do
not reflect accurately the experience of state courts. A study of state
courts revealed about a nine percent increase in tort claims between
1978 and 1984, while the population grew by eight percent.224 The study
215. In the period from 1981 to 1985, underwriting losses amounted to $66 billion, but in-
vestment gains amounted to $97 billion, resulting in a net gain of $31 billion. Insurance Crisis
Hearings, supra note 213, at 86.
216. Id. Underwriting losses were $19.4 billion and investment gains were $17.9 billion. In
1985 the situation improved and investment gains were again greater than underwriting losses, by
$7.6 billion. Id.
217. Salomon Brothers forecasted that industry profits would rise annually at a rate of 25%
in the period 1985-1989. Id. at 91.
218. Outlook for Product Safety & Liability in 1987, 15 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 47,
51 (1987) ("The insurance industry, which took the lead in promoting [tort and product liability]
changes in 1986, will stay behind the scenes this year").
219. Net income in 1986 was roughly $11.5 billion and insurance costs were leveling. Id.
220. Page & Stephens, The Product Liability Insurance "Crisis". Causes, Nostrums and
Cures, 13 CAP. U. L. REv. 387, 388 (1984).
221. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at 45. In 1974 only 1,579 claims had been
filed; by 1985 the figure had grown to 13,554. Id.
222. Id. (stating that "[t]here is no reason to believe that the state courts have not witnessed
a similar dramatic increase in the number of product liability claims").
223. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3, 6 (1986).
224. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL RE-
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concluded that there was "no evidence to support the often cited exis-
tence of a national 'litigation explosion' in state trial courts during the
1981-1984 period." 2 5
Marked increases have occurred in some types of suits, especially
those involving mass latent injuries, such as claims involving asbestos
and the Dalkon Shield.22 6 A high percentage of the growth in federal
claims is attributable to asbestos claims,22 7 but they may constitute a
unique, never-to-be-repeated phenomenon. 228 Thus, while areas of steep
growth may call for targeted reforms,22 overall court statistics do not
establish a litigation explosion that warrants general reform of products
liability law.
Underlying the claim that too many suits are being filed is the be-
lief that too many claims are frivolous and undeserving of attention by
the tort system. The real problem, however, may be quite the opposite,
that too few meritorious claims are being filed.2s0 Evidence suggests
that victims bring suits in only a small percentage of the circumstances
in which they would be warranted.2"1 The high costs of litigation screen
PORT 1984, pt. 2 (Ct. Statistics & Info. Mgmt. Project, 1986) [hereinafter NCSC REPORT], noted in
Galanter, supra note 224, at 6-7.
225. NCSC REPORT, supra note 224, at 173. There were significant increases, however, in the
number of filings between 1978 and 1981. Significant increases have occurred in states that have
experienced the greatest increases in population. Id.
226. D. HENSLER, M. VAIANA, J. KAKALIK & M PETERSON, TRENDS IN TORT LTGATION: THE
STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 10 (1987) [hereinafter STORY BEHIND STATISTICS]. In 1981 there were
an estimated 16,000 asbestos claims and by 1986 there were 30,000; in 1981 there were 7,500
Dalkon Shield claims and by 1986, after A.H. Robins had sought protection under a Chapter 11
Bankruptcy petition, there were 325,000 claims. Id.
227. Asbestos claims account for about 30% of the products liability claims in federal courts.
Galanter, supra note 224, at 24-25.
228. T. WILLGING, TRENDS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION, at xi-xii (1987). The author identifies
several features of the asbestos litigation that make it unique, among them that the substance was
used so widely and for such a long period, that manufacturers suppressed evidence about its dan-
gers, and that general causation was clearly established, although specific causation was difficult in
individual cases. The author concludes that the "singularity of asbestos litigation extends back-
wards and forwards: There are no historical analogues and no projected recurrences of similar
phenomena." Id. at xii.
229. ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS, supra note 203, at 117-24 (calling for a high-level commission
to propose alternatives to or alterations in the tort system to deal specifically with mass toxic tort
claims).
230. See Sugarman, Serious Tort Law Reform, 24 SAN Dmoo L. REV. 795, 799 (1987). (stating
that "many people are intimidated by the idea of bringing a lawsuit to redress their rights, or do
not even realize that they have legal rights to redress" (citing British study of accident victims, D.
HARRIS, COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY 45-78 (1984))).
231. See Saks, If There Be A Crisis, How Shall We Know It?, 46 MD. L. REv. 63, 69 (1986)
(stating that "[w]hile I am aware of no adequate data on the ratio of false positive (invalid claims
granted) to false negative errors (valid claims uncompensated), the system does appear to contain
a large percentage of false negatives" (citing empirical studies showing that one in twenty-five
patients with valid medical malpractice claims recover through the tort system and one-quarter of
consumer complaints are never pursued)).
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out the lower range of claims that are not economically feasible." 2
C. Increases in the Size of Recoveries
A third basis for reform is the argument that damage awards have
grown astronomically and need to be contained. Again, the empirical
evidence suggests a more complicated picture than generally has been
portrayed.33 While jury awards have increased in products liability and
medical malpractice cases, the evidence does not necessarily reflect that
juries are "out of control." 4 Much of the growth in the size of awards
is accounted for by changes in economic and social conditions, not by
juries gone wild.23 6 Factors that increase awards include inflation, medi-
cal costs beyond inflation, long life expectations, and higher incomes.23 8
Furthermore, awards often are reduced after trial, with the highest
awards being reduced the most.23 7
D. Increases in the Cost of Litigation
The real crisis in the tort system may well be the delays and in-
creased cost of litigating claims.238 The period between injury and com-
pensation can span as much as five years.239 In the largest trial court in
the nation, the time between initial filing and final disposition of a case
averages four years.24 ° State court statistics show that only about half
the tort cases are resolved in less than two years and about ten percent
232. Id. at 71 n.31. The author states that
[B]ecause cases involving complex litigation generally are difficult and expensive to prepare,
an unusually large fraction of them probably are screened out by attorneys. It makes no eco-
nomic sense for an attorney to take such a case unless the value of the injury is well over
three times the cost of preparing the case.
Id.
233. See STORY BEHIND STATIsTIcs, supra note 227, at 12-24.
234. Id. at 21. The report did find higher awards in products liability, medical malpractice,
and workplace injuries than in auto cases; even in cases in which the same degree of injury has
occurred. The "premium" in the larger awards could be due to the deep pockets of the defendants
or to the juries' determinations that these defendants can be deterred most effectively from their
misconduct by higher awards. Id. The report concluded that more research is needed to determine
why and how juries reach their conclusions. Possible explanations are that the cases are changing
and juries are doing a better job of calculating losses. Id.
235. M. COOPER, TRENDS IN LIABILITY AWARDS: HAVE JURIES RUN WILD? (1986).
236. Id.
237. STORY BEHIND STATIsTIcs, supra note 227, at 22-24.
238. See Civiletti, Zeroing in on the Real Litigation Crisis: Irrational Justice, Needless De-
lays, Excessive Costs, 46 MD. L. REv. 40 (1986).
239. Product Liability Voluntary Claims and Uniform Standards Act: Hearings on S. 1999
Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Trans-
portation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1986) (testimony of Deborah Chalfie, Legislative Director,
HALT, An Organization of Americans for Legal Reform).
240. Civiletti, supra note 239, at 45.
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require four years or more.241
The costs of the system are extremely high. Studies reveal that the
litigation costs account for more than half of the total amount spent on
a tort suit.242 The net compensation to plaintiffs in nonautomobile tort
litigation is forty-three percent of the total expenditures.243 In more
complex cases, plaintiffs recover an even lower percentage of total ex-
penditures.244 Thus, reforms to reduce the transactional costs of the
system may be needed desperately.
The reforms considered in this Article, however, do nothing to de-
crease the costs of litigating product claims. Indeed, as discussed ear-
lier,245  the reforms would increase, perhaps substantially, the
complexity and the cost of litigating plaintiffs' claims and would exacer-
bate the problem of transaction costs. In sum, the proposed reforms,
with all their weaknesses, cannot be justified on the basis of a products
liability/insurance "crisis."
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has set forth a number of reasons why federal regula-
tory standards should not be treated as conclusively or presumptively
adequate measures of safety under the common law.
First, as a practical matter, regulatory standards do not readily
mesh with the issues at stake in tort litigation. Often regulations are
drafted in general terms and are ambiguous in scope. To determine
their applicability with any precision on a case-by-case basis (as would
be necessary if compliance were to be given special weight) would com-
plicate the litigation of compliance cases and disadvantage plaintiffs.
Allowing juries to consider regulatory compliance and to weigh it as
they find appropriate, as they do currently, is a far more simple and fair
approach.
Second, the regulatory system is incapable of keeping standards
sufficiently up-to-date for the tort system. The agencies often have
neither the resources nor the will to do so. Given the prospects of con-
tinuing federal budget deficits and cutbacks in agency resources, this
problem is likely to continue well into the next decade. The proposed
241. Id. Experiments in some jurisdictions with case management and the use of alternative
dispute resolution have shown, however, that such delays can be reduced.
242. STORY BEHIND STATISTICS, supra note 227, at 27-29.
243. Id. at 27. Defendants' time, legal fees, and expenses constitute 30% of the costs; plain-
tiffs' time, legal fees, and expenses account for 26% of costs; and court expenditures and claims
processing constitute 4% of costs. Id.
244. Id. at 27-28. In asbestos cases, plaintiffs recover 37% of total costs. Id. at 28-29. Defend-
ants' legal fees and expenses increase to 37% of total costs in these cases. Id.
245. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
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reforms also could make the regulatory process itself more complicated
and could encourage more industry lobbying for protective regulatory
standards. If so, the regulatory process could become even slower, which
would make the problem of obsolescence even greater.
Finally, increasing the role of the federal government over the
products liability system and decreasing that of the courts is troubling.
It centralizes control of the tort system in a few federal agencies and
makes it subject to increased business and political pressure, as has oc-
curred during the Reagan Administration. Indeed, the example of the
Reagan Administration should serve as a warning of the risks inherent
in making tort standards reflect those of the federal regulatory system.
The tort system is hardly perfect, and reforms are clearly needed to
reduce the transaction costs of the system, but it continues to serve as
an independent incentive for product safety in this country.

